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I. INTRODUCTION
State courts are paramount in defining the constitutional right to vote. This
primacy of state courts exists in part because the right to vote is a state-based
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right protected under state constitutions.1 In addition, election administration is
largely state-driven, with states regulating most of the rules for casting and
counting ballots.2 State law thus guarantees—and state courts interpret—the
voting rights that we cherish so much as a society. State courts that issue
rulings broadly defining the constitutional right to vote best protect the most
fundamental right in our democracy; state decisions that constrain voting to a
narrower scope do harm to that ideal.
Even though state courts are the primary actors in shaping the right to
vote, however, most people pay less attention to state judges than to their
federal counterparts. The media, for example, spend relatively little time
covering state voting rights decisions.3 Most election law scholars focus
primarily on decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court.4 This emphasis is
inherently backward given how active state courts are in regulating the voting
process.5 From voter ID, to felon disenfranchisement, to the mechanics of
Election Day, state courts are intimately involved in setting out the rules for an
election and giving scope to the constitutional right to vote. For example,
federal courts have issued far fewer opinions on voter ID laws than state courts
have in the past decade,6 and yet the federal court opinions have received most
of the attention from scholars, the media, and the public.7
Why do federal court decisions regarding the right to vote seem more
prominent than state cases? For one, U.S. Supreme Court opinions apply
nationwide, resulting in immense and justifiable scrutiny when the Court
renders decisions on issues of high salience, such as voting rights. With
respect to lower courts, federal judges have a larger geographic reach than
their state counterparts.8 Further, federal constitutional rulings are based on the
1 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 89, 101–03 (2014) (noting that forty-nine of fifty states explicitly confer the right to
vote to the state’s citizens, and the only exception, Arizona, still requires elections to be
“free and equal,” which its courts have interpreted as granting the right to vote).
2 See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of
State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 354–55 (2008) (noting that state legislatures are the primary
source of laws regulating election administration).
3 See infra Part II.B. The media also spend very little time covering state judicial
elections. See Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553, 567
(2014) (citing Martin Kaplan et al., Local News Coverage of the 2004 Campaign: An
Analysis of Nightly Broadcasts in 11 Markets, LOC. NEWS ARCHIVE 9–12, 28–29 (Feb. 15,
2005), http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf).
4 See infra Part II.C.
5 As a general matter state courts issue thousands more decisions than federal courts
every year, affecting millions more people. See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public
Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 456–57 (2010).
6 See infra Part III.A.
7 See infra Part II.B.
8 Federal appellate courts, for example, cover multiple states, and federal trial
districts are larger than state trial districts. Compare, e.g., Geographic Boundaries of
United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S. CTS.,
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U.S. Constitution, which obviously has more prominence than (and supremacy
over) state constitutions.9
But as this Article shows—through a detailed, comparative examination of
state court cases involving the voting process—state judges are often the main
actors in defining the constitutional right to vote under their state constitutions,
which then impact the meaning of voting rights in federal elections as well.10
Yet the decisions deviate markedly across states on the protection afforded to
voting, with some judges issuing broad pronouncements on the primacy of the
right to vote and other judges more narrowly construing the constitutional
safeguard. If we want to preserve the right to vote as the most fundamental and
foundational right in our democracy, then we need to recognize this
divergence so that we can devise strategies to encourage broader rulings.
We should favor a broad analysis of the constitutional right to vote
because voting is the most important, fundamental right that underlies our
entire democracy.11 Voting should be as easy as practically possible for all
eligible voters, tempered only with whatever regulation is required that does
not unnecessarily cause disenfranchisement; the foundation of our democracy
begins with individuals going to the polls to select leaders to govern them.12
Achieving this robust protection requires a comprehensive understanding of
how state judges rule in these cases, accompanied by a call for state judges to
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD8A-2ZQP],
with Kentucky Court of Justice Judicial Circuits, KY. CT. JUSTICE, http://courts.ky.gov/
resources/publicationsresources/Publications/P107KYJudicialCircuitsMap85x11_211web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HG2-YK4Y] (showing the significantly larger geographical reach of
federal courts in comparison to state trial districts).
9 Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583,
1605 (2010) (citing a study which found that forty-eight percent of respondents were
unaware that their state had a constitution).
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that “the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature”); id. amend. XVII (same for U.S. Senators); see also Franita Tolson,
Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56
B.C. L. REV. 159, 164 (2015) (arguing that, in defining voting rights, “Article I, Section 2
of the U.S. Constitution incorporates state substantive law governing voter qualifications as
well as democratic norms regarding access to the franchise that were nascent during the
founding era, but quickly developed over the course of the nineteenth century”).
11 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of Participation: A Response
to Professor Flanders, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 81, 99 (2013).
12 Id. This Article begins with the premise that voting is the most important right in
our democracy and that therefore we should favor judicial decisions and judges who will
protect that right broadly. For a further discussion of why courts should robustly construe
the constitutional right to vote, see id. at 81 (“Voting is the foundational concept for our
entire democratic structure. We think of voting as a fundamental—the most fundamental—
right in our democracy. When a group of citizens collectively elects its representatives, it
affirms the notion that we govern ourselves by free choice. An individual’s right to vote
ties that person to our social order, even if that person chooses not to exercise that right.
Voting represents the beginning; everything else in our democracy follows the right to
vote. Participation is more than just a value. It is a foundational virtue of our democracy.”).
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construe their state constitution’s grant of voting rights to the fullest extent
possible. In addition, the analysis of state judicial decisions on the right to vote
can help us discern how ideology and judicial selection may influence whether
a judge is likely to interpret the right to vote broadly or narrowly, thereby
adding to the debate over the kinds of state judges we want on the bench.
Analyzing state court cases on the right to vote in a detailed manner will
have a significant effect nationwide. Many state court opinions rely on
decisions from other states, especially when considering similar issues. When
a state court faces an important election law case, such as one about a voter ID
requirement, it is going to consider the views of its sister states.13 Federal
courts also look to state jurisprudence. Thus, state courts do not issue decisions
in a vacuum; the cases are often interrelated. Increased scrutiny on how state
courts have decided these issues can illuminate why state judges should rule
broadly on voting rights, which can have a multiplying effect in other states.
Following this Introduction in Part I, Part II shows how our outsized focus
on federal courts, at the expense of state courts, is misplaced. It first examines
the importance of state courts in deciding constitutional law issues. It then
compares the differences in media and scholarly attention for federal versus
state right-to-vote decisions, demonstrating how our discussion over voting
rights cases is disproportionately skewed toward federal courts even though
state judges do more of the work in this realm. Part III dives into the state
cases in three specific areas as representative samples: voter ID, felon
disenfranchisement, and the voting process; this final category includes
decisions on electronic voting machines, extending polling hours on Election
Day, and counting absentee ballots. By examining over thirty state court cases
issued in the last decade, this Part demonstrates just how involved state courts
have been in shaping the meaning of the constitutional right to vote. It also
shows how state judges differ on whether they interpret the right to vote
broadly or narrowly—that is, whether judges robustly construe their
constitutions as going beyond the federal constitution in protecting voters, or
instead narrowly view their constitutions as merely coterminous with the U.S.
Constitution. Part IV then looks at whether a judge’s ideology or the judicial
selection method may correlate with the scope of a right-to-vote decision.
Although further quantitative empirical studies are needed, as a preliminary
finding, the evidence in Part IV shows that liberal-leaning judges are more
likely to construe the right to vote broadly as compared to conservative jurists,
especially for partisan-laden issues such as voter ID. In addition, appointed
judges seem more likely than elected judges to define the right to vote
robustly, at least for certain topics such as felon disenfranchisement. This
analysis can contribute to the existing debate over who we want as judges as
well as offer insights on the preferable method of judicial selection.

13 Indeed, many of the state court cases discussed in Part III have done just that, with
state courts looking to their sister state courts as part of the analysis. See infra Part III.
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Ultimately, providing the most robust protection for the constitutional
right to vote requires us, as scholars and advocates, to understand both how
state courts construe these rights and how ideology and judicial selection may
influence the state judges who issue these opinions. This Article begins that
process.

II. STATE JUDGES AND VOTING LITIGATION
State judges decide thousands of constitutional law cases every year and
numerous cases involving the right to vote. Yet both the media and scholars
have largely ignored state courts and their effect on voting rights. Instead, the
focus is primarily on federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. To
understand the true meaning of the constitutional right to vote, however, we
need to look more closely at state judges and how they rule in these cases.

A. State Courts and Constitutional Law
State supreme courts decide around 2,000 constitutional law cases every
year, while the U.S. Supreme Court issues only about thirty.14 Yet both
scholars and the media assiduously cover the U.S. Supreme Court and give
correspondingly little consideration to state supreme courts,15 unless a state
court issues a decision of high public salience such as one involving same-sex
marriage.16 That is, most constitutional law is promulgated in state judiciaries,
yet as a society we pay relatively little attention to that phenomenon.17
Constitutional law cases involve some of the most important issues a court
decides because of their impact on the structure of democratic governance, yet
“[t]he public generally ‘lacks sufficient information to have clear, considered,
and internally consistent judgments about exactly what the judicial role under
the Constitution either is or ought to be.’”18 But the public should care about
the ways in which state courts decide these cases. Indeed, “[b]ecause state
courts are closer to the people, their operations may be critical to ‘popular

14 See Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 456–57.
15 See infra Parts II.B–C.
16 See, e.g., Associated Press, N.J. Supreme Court to Hear Same-Sex Marriage Case,

CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nj-supreme-court-to-hearsame-sex-marriage-case [https://perma.cc/HMR7-G3UN].
17 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account:
Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1629, 1635 (2010) (“Over the past thirty years, state courts have eclipsed the U.S. Supreme
Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values, both in their home states and
throughout the nation.”).
18 Bam, supra note 3, at 567 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the
Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1825 (2005)).
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constitutionalism’s objective of reasserting democratic control over
[constitutional] meaning.’”19
The lack of attention to state courts means that citizens—who vote to elect
or retain judges in thirty-nine states20—have woefully little information to
assist them in making their choices.21 As one scholar notes, “the voter
ignorance problem is particularly acute in judicial elections because of the
nature of the judicial office, the opaqueness of judicial performance, and the
lack of useful cues and heuristics that allow voters to compensate for their lack
of relevant knowledge.”22 Voters therefore use proxies such as the candidate’s
name, sex, ethnicity, or party affiliation to guide their decisions.23
A renewed focus on state courts and how they interpret important
constitutional principles will help those who select our state judges—voters,
Governors, or independent commissions—base their choices on more relevant
factors, such as the judges’ likely ability to analyze these constitutional issues
in a way that best comports with the ideals of popular democracy. An
evaluation of state right-to-vote cases might also tell us whether elected versus
appointed judges are better at broadly construing the state-conferred
constitutional right to vote.24 If voting is the most fundamental right in our

19 David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 2047, 2067 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal
Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1003, 1023 (2006)).
20 See Benjamin R. Hardy, Note, Judicial Selection Question: Why Is It Time for
Preemptive Reform of Kentucky’s Judicial Selection Method?, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
379, 386 (2014) (discussing the various methods by which judges are selected throughout
the states).
21 See Jordan M. Singer, Knowing Is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective
Performance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 725, 726
(2007) (noting that “all too frequently voters are confronted at the polls with an
‘information problem’: they face a slate of judicial candidates about which they know
nothing particularly relevant, or even nothing at all”). As another study showed,

[m]any people, including those that had previously voted in a judicial election, do not
even know that judges in their state are elected. While at least some people can name
a Supreme Court Justice or two, most voters are unable to name a single state court
judge, at any level of the state judiciary.

Bam, supra note 3, at 568 (footnote omitted).
22 Bam, supra note 3, at 565–66.
23 See Singer, supra note 21, at 727–28. Professor Singer notes that “a significant
number of voters apparently cast a vote without any rationale whatsoever,” highlighting
one study in which “38% of those surveyed who had just cast a vote could not articulate a
reason why they had voted the way they did.” Id. at 728; see also ILYA SOMIN,
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 3–4
(2013) (concluding that Americans are generally too ignorant about politics and civic
affairs to govern themselves on a national scale).
24 See infra Part IV.B.
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democracy,25 then we should favor judges who will issue rulings that robustly
protect that right for all voters.

B. State Courts, Voting Rights, and (Lack of) Media Coverage
Studies show that there is woefully little media coverage of state court
decisions.26 This inattention to state courts is in spite of the fact that every year
state judges shape the meaning of the constitutional right to vote, one of the
most cherished rights in our democracy. Although the media pay greater
attention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions involving voting rights, state
courts issue more opinions than federal courts that define the scope of our
participatory democracy.27 Moreover, many state court election law cases are
more significant than their federal counterparts because they often define
voting itself, which is ultimately a state-based right under state constitutions.28
As a society, we must not ignore these important institutions.
The national media’s attention, however, is skewed dramatically toward
the U.S. Supreme Court’s voting rights decisions. For instance, in 2012—a
presidential election year—the U.S. Supreme Court decided only two cases
that arguably impacted the constitutional right to vote: Perry v. Perez29 and
Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission,30 both about redistricting.31 These
decisions received outsized attention in the media. The Perry v. Perez opinion,
reversing the lower court’s decision on Texas’s redistricting, was reported in
national newspapers32 and was the subject of editorials in both the New York

25 See Douglas, supra note 11, at 81.
26 See Richard L. Vining, Jr. & Teena Wilhelm, Explaining High-Profile Coverage of

State Supreme Court Decisions, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 704, 720–21 (2010) (noting that “[w]hen
the premier print media outlets in the U.S. states cover courts of last resort, it is primarily
due to either the characteristics of decisions or bench politics”).
27 See Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
101, 103 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011) (noting that “state court cases have made
up a majority of election challenge cases heard in the courts in every year but one in the
last twelve years”).
28 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 95–105.
29 Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam).
30 Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012).
31 The Court also issued an important decision on campaign finance, American
Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012), that required state
courts to apply the holding of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), to state law. In
addition, it summarily affirmed, without comment, a lower court decision on campaign
finance in Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (mem.).
32 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Sides with Texas on Redistricting Plan, WASH.
POST (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-sides-withtexas-on-redistricting-plan/2012/01/20/gIQAzjBhDQ_story.html [https://perma.cc/TGV5MXFZ].
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Times33 and the Wall Street Journal.34 The Tennant case, about West
Virginia’s redistricting, did not garner as much editorial commentary, but it
still made national news in publications such as the New York Times,35 as well
as the Associated Press36 and Reuters37 news services.
By contrast, that same year, state supreme courts issued numerous
decisions that affected the upcoming election, but these cases generally
received scant media attention. For instance, shortly before the candidate filing
deadline, the Missouri Supreme Court rendered an opinion calling into
question the state’s redistricting for congressional districts, yet the case made
barely a ripple beyond Missouri’s borders.38 Few national publications picked
up the story, and when they did, they simply ran the Associated Press’s short
summary as part of their regional coverage.39 Similarly, there were very few
stories40 about the Minnesota Supreme Court’s August 2012 decision rejecting
a challenge to a ballot proposition that, if the voters had passed it, would have
added a voter ID requirement to Minnesota’s Constitution.41 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court issued a contentious 3–2 decision, with a vigorous dissent,
denying a manual recount in a primary for a state house seat,42 and yet the

33 See

Editorial, Redistricting in Texas, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/opinion/redistricting-in-texas.html [https://perma.cc/
XMU4-PPZX].
34 See Editorial, Holder’s Texas Defeat, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 21, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204301404577173030198183616 [https://
perma.cc/Z3KZ-5DTL].
35 See Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Map for West Virginia Voting, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/us/politics/supreme-court-upholdsw-virginia-voter-map.html [https://perma.cc/4GGF-43KF].
36 See Associated Press, Justices Back New Districts in West Virginia,
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/09/25/highcourt-upholds-west-virginia-congressional-districts/9Oym6x9FlmyU09knuUokaM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/3ETA-QS73].
37 See Terry Baynes & Jonathan Stempel, Supreme Court Upholds West Virginia
Redistricting, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtwestvirginia-elections-idUSBRE88O0S820120925 [https://perma.cc/PMB3-A92G].
38 Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Mo. 2012).
39 See Associated Press, Missouri: Court Rejects State Redistricting Map,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/us/missouri-courtrejects-state-redistricting-map.html [https://perma.cc/MXG6-PAUW].
40 A search of news stories for “Minnesota” and “voter ID” within a week of the
decision produced very few relevant hits beyond an Associated Press alert on the website
Real Clear Politics. See Martiga Lohn & Patrick Condon, Minnesota Court Rejects
Challenge to Photo ID, REAL CLEAR POL. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
news/ap/politics/2012/Aug/27/minnesota_court_rejects_challenge_to_photo_id.html [https://
perma.cc/V9NP-2HXC].
41 League of Women Voters of Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Minn. 2012)
(per curiam).
42 Tobon v. R.I. Bd. of Elections, 62 A.3d 1126, 1126, 1128 (R.I. 2012).
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only significant news coverage was from a local paper.43 These are just a few
examples of important state court election law cases that failed to garner any
national attention.44
To be sure, the media sometimes provide greater coverage of a state case
involving a hot-button issue, such as a ruling on the constitutionality of a voter
ID law. For instance, national media reported a Pennsylvania trial court
decision45 upholding that state’s voter ID requirement.46 Then again, beyond a
short story in the Associated Press (reprinted in various publications, including
the New York Times),47 the national media were largely silent when, just a
week before Election Day, a Tennessee appellate court upheld that state’s
voter ID law while ruling that Memphis voters could show their City of
Memphis library card to prove their identity at the polls.48 Perhaps the fact that
Pennsylvania is considered a “swing” state while Tennessee is not led the
national media to report the Pennsylvania opinion and not the Tennessee case,
even though each decision played a significant role in the conduct of the
election in its respective state.
Similarly, the national media paid a lot more attention to a federal district
court decision striking down Wisconsin’s voter ID law than it did to similar
decisions just two years earlier by Wisconsin state trial judges. The federal
court case49 was the subject of a New York Times Editorial.50 By contrast, the
43 See Katherine Gregg, Pawtucket—High Court Denies Hand Recount in R.I. House
Race, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 6, 2012, at 1.
44 By contrast, in 2014 the national media did cover a Florida trial court’s decision
invalidating that state’s congressional districting plan, perhaps because it was one of the
first decisions to throw out a redistricting scheme for unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering. See Robert Barnes, Florida Judge Takes on Gerrymandering;
Sets Stage for Supreme Court Cases in Fall, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/florida-judge-takes-on-gerrymanderingsets-stage-for-supreme-court-cases-in-fall/2014/08/03/df7ccb88-18e7-11e4-85b6-c1451e62
2637_story.html [https://perma.cc/4VNB-FFKF].
45 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *32
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam).
46 E.g., Ethan Bronner, Pennsylvania Judge Keeps Voter ID Law Intact on Its Way to
Higher Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/us/
politics/pennsylvania-judge-keeps-voter-id-law-intact.html [https://perma.cc/8FLX-7E5F];
see Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); see also Robert
Barnes, Pennsylvania Voter ID Law Sent Back to Lower Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 18,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/pennsylvania-voter-id-lawsent-back-to-lower-court/2012/09/18/ded55652-01b8-11e2-b257-e1c2b3548a4a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7JHB-U6XT].
47 Associated Press, Tennessee: Court Upholds Voter Identification Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/us/tennessee-court-upholds-voteridentification-law.html [https://perma.cc/94ES-5JNY].
48 City of Memphis v. Hargett, No. M2012-02141-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5265006,
at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012), aff’d, 414 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 2013).
49 Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744
(7th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
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New York Times mentioned the Wisconsin state court opinions only briefly as
part of a broader discussion over voter ID, including them within an analysis
of the Department of Justice’s decision to block Texas’s voter ID law that
same week.51 Similarly, major newspapers around the country printed an
Associated Press article about the 2014 federal trial court ruling, but these
same publications made little mention of the similar 2012 state trial court
decisions.52
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the media should not cover
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on voting rights. As the nation’s highest court,
the U.S. Supreme Court and its decisions are inherently newsworthy; its
rulings can also play into a pre-existing storyline, such as how the Texas
redistricting case exemplified the clash between Southern states and the
Department of Justice.53 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions apply
nationwide, while individual state court rulings directly affect only voters in
those states. Indeed, local media may adequately cover a state court decision
that impacts that state’s elections.
But limiting coverage to local media or to federal court decisions makes it
harder for the public to recognize the broader message: state courts widely
influence how we understand the right to vote. Even if local voters know about
a particular state court decision, this limited awareness obscures the reality
that, everywhere in the country, state courts make important rulings on voting
rights. It is therefore curious that state court judgments, which in the aggregate
have a larger impact on the electoral process and can have effects across
borders as other state and federal courts rely on them, receive comparatively
scant attention from the media and the public. The lack of attention to state
courts diminishes the public’s awareness of how these institutions shape
fundamental rights, such as the right to vote.54 The news media need not stop
covering the federal courts, but they should also give greater attention to state
courts and their election law decisions.

50 See Editorial, Voter ID Is the Real Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/opinion/voter-id-is-the-real-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/
P3WP-ZRXV].
51 See, e.g., Editorial, A Rejection of Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/opinion/a-rejection-of-discrimination.html [https://
perma.cc/Y2Q2-H98N].
52 See, e.g., Dinesh Ramde, AP, Federal Judge Strikes Down Wisconsin Voter ID
Law, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-world/
nation/article/Federal-judge-strikes-down-Wisconsin-voter-ID-law-5439627.php [https://
perma.cc/JLD7-89N9].
53 See Adam Liptak, Justices’ Texas Redistricting Ruling Likely to Help G.O.P.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/us/supreme-court-rejectsjudge-drawn-maps-in-texas-redistricting-case.html [https://perma.cc/8ZEA-QMJP].
54 See Vining & Wilhelm, supra note 26, at 721.
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C. Scholarly Attention to State Courts and the Right to Vote
The media are not the only culprits in focusing too heavily on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s election law cases at the expense of state court jurisprudence.
Scholars, too, have spent most of their energy dissecting only the key U.S.
Supreme Court precedent in this area. In comparison, there has been little
scholarship on the role of state courts in shaping the constitutional right to
vote. As Professor Adam Winkler has written,
Election law scholars have paid insufficient attention to state court
adjudication of laws regulating electoral politics. The focus has been on
federal law and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, even though each of the fifty
states has its own set of detailed election regulations. Not only is state law a
diverse, plentiful, and untapped lode for study, but state courts have
historically exercised the responsibility to decide the constitutionality of
state-level electoral reforms prior to the federal courts. It is to the state courts,
therefore, that one must often look to discover the doctrinal foundations of
election law, laid by state judges when first confronted with challenges to
reforms.55

Yet virtually all recent scholarship on the right to vote has focused either
on U.S. Supreme Court cases or has isolated a single state’s jurisprudence.56
There have been very few articles looking at state courts holistically or
comparatively to discern how they affect voting rights.57 For example, just a
week after the 2012 presidential election, the George Washington Law Review
hosted a symposium on political law, and the law review itself published
articles from that event.58 All of the articles in that issue considering voting

55 Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political Party
Regulation in the State Courts, 1886–1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (2000).
56 Although a few prior articles have focused on specific states, there is little scholarly
commentary—besides my own previous work—providing a broad-based and holistic look
at the role of state courts in shaping the constitutional right to vote. See Douglas, supra
note 1, at 89. For examples of scholarship examining a single state, see Matthew C. Jones,
Fraud and the Franchise: The Pennsylvania Constitution’s “Free and Equal Election”
Clause as an Independent Basis for State and Local Election Challenges, 68 TEMP. L. REV.
1473, 1475 (1995); Robert W. Stockstill, Comment, Voting and Election Law in the
Louisiana Constitution, 46 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1986); and Hannah Tokerud,
Comment, The Right of Suffrage in Montana: Voting Protections Under the State
Constitution, 74 MONT. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (2013).
57 One recent exception is a “working paper” comparing four state Voting Rights
Acts. See Paige A. Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through State Voting
Rights Acts 2 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 474, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2422915 [https://perma.cc/V2WT-KJBA].
58 See generally Spencer Overton, Foreword, Political Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1783 (2013).
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rights and the judiciary focused on the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal
courts.59 There was virtually no discussion of state courts.
A key U.S. Supreme Court case will often garner vigorous scholarly
attention. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby
County v. Holder,60 which in essence gutted the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance mechanism under which certain states had to seek federal
preapproval for any voting changes, has already been the subject of numerous
articles.61 Similarly, the Court’s decision to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law has
been the focus of much scholarly commentary.62 None of this scholarship is
unwarranted or unnecessary, and it is all vital to exploring and understanding
the U.S. Supreme Court’s role in elections. But when a state, or a series of
states, has dealt with the same issues—such as voter ID—academics have
generally failed to analyze these decisions holistically and comparatively in a
way that highlights the importance of state judges in shaping the right to
vote.63
59 See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, Unfinished Business: Protecting Voting Rights in the

Twenty-First Century, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1928, 1928 (2013) (analyzing the impact of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder invalidating Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act); Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law Pleading, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1966, 1966 (2013) (considering the effect on election litigation of new procedural rules set
out in recent U.S. Supreme Court cases); Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and
Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1847–51 (2013) (analyzing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Anderson–Burdick balancing test for election law cases); Richard L.
Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1865–66 (2013) (looking at how federal judges thwarted
Republican-led attempts to change election rules). I was thrilled to participate in the GW
Law Review symposium, and my comments here are not intended as a criticism of that
excellent event or the topics discussed by its esteemed contributors. Instead, I am merely
observing that a holistic analysis of state courts and voting rights has generally not been at
the forefront of most scholarly consideration of election law.
60 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
61 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 715 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination
Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 100 (2013); Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to
Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 74 (2014).
62 See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The History of Voter ID Laws and the Story of
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 453 (Joshua A.
Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016); Edward B. Foley, Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board: Voter ID, 5–4? If So, So What?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 63, 63 (2008); Justin
Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION
L.J. 97, 103–09 (2012); Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting
Disfranchisement: Voter Identification During Indiana’s 2008 General Election, 25 J.L. &
POL. 329, 329–32 (2009).
63 One notable exception is Professor James Gardner’s work considering state
constitutions and partisan gerrymandering. See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and
the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 893–900 (1997). In addition, Professors Michael Kang and Joanna
Shepherd have explored extensively the impact of campaign contributions on state judicial
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Again, much as there is for the media, there is an obvious and justified
reason for election law scholars to focus their energy on U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. Scholars are well suited to dissect and analyze jurisprudence that
applies nationwide. The Court’s opinions are part of our national conversation,
and election law scholars are vital in shaping that debate—especially when the
Court may have gone astray. Yet state courts are perhaps more important
sources of voting rights law because their rulings are based on the explicit
conferral of the right to vote in state constitutions. Sometimes state judges will
rule broadly toward voting, but other times state judicial decisions are narrow.
Understanding these theoretical and normative differences is vital to achieving
robust protection for the constitutional right to vote.

III. STATE COURT CASES INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE
The right to vote enjoys protection in both the U.S. Constitution and all
fifty state constitutions, yet the scope of that safeguard is broader in state
constitutions than in the federal document.64 The U.S. Constitution protects
the right to vote only implicitly through the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; there is no direct conferral of voting rights.65 The
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is no federal right to vote
and that once a state grants the right to vote, it simply must do so on equal
terms.66 By contrast, virtually every state explicitly confers the right to vote to
all state citizens in its state constitution.67 State protection for the right to vote
is therefore more robust than what is provided under federal law.
Stemming from these state sources of voting rights, state courts decide
numerous cases that shape the meaning of the constitutional right to vote and
dictate the rules for an election. This Part discusses some of the most common
voting rights controversies state courts have adjudicated since 2000, when the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore68 created a burgeoning field of
rulings, finding that political parties play a major role in funding judicial campaigns and
that judges often rule in ways that help the parties who funded them. See Michael S. Kang
& Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign Finance, 86 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2013) (“Contributions from the Democratic coalition are
associated with judges voting in a liberal direction across their judicial decisionmaking,
while contributions from the Republican coalition are associated with judges voting more
in a conservative direction.”). Professor Shepherd has also found that campaign
contributions from business interests affect judicial outcomes. See JOANNA SHEPHERD,
AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 8 (June 2013),
OF
http://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VLK3-SA52].
64 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 95–105.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
66 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
67 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 101.
68 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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litigation involving election administration,69 or what one might call “the law
of voting.”70 Although there are certainly other election-related issues state
courts hear, this Part focuses on three prevalent categories that demonstrate the
dichotomy between broad and narrow rulings on the constitutional right to
vote: voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and the voting process.71
The goal of this Part is to engage in the inquiry that Part II revealed is
missing from current election law scholarship: a detailed look at state court
adjudication of voting rights issues. The analysis shows both that state courts
are playing a vital role in election law disputes and that judges across states
often come out differently on how they define the constitutional right to vote.
State judges either broadly construe state constitutions as going beyond the
federal constitution or instead narrowly analyze the state protection to be
merely co-extensive with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings under federal law.
As the discussion reveals, the broader interpretation is the better mode of
analysis for protecting voting as a fundamental right that is foundational to our
concept of democracy.

A. Voter ID
The controversy over voter identification laws has been the most salient,
hot-button issue surrounding the right to vote over the past decade.72 Many
states have enacted new regulations requiring voters to show some form of
identification at the polls before voting.73 These laws have been subject to
69 As Professor Rick Hasen has recounted, Bush v. Gore demonstrated to scholars that

the nuts-and-bolts aspects of election administration were worthy of greater attention. See
Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 377–78 (2001).
70 See EDWARD B. FOLEY, MICHAEL J. PITTS & JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS, ELECTION LAW
AND LITIGATION: THE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF POLITICS 573 (2014).
71 Importantly, I am not attempting to catalog every case state courts have decided
impacting the right to vote. That kind of inquiry would necessarily be both imprecise
(because not all state court cases are reported and because there would be considerable
debate on what kinds of cases impact the right to vote) and less useful than a sustained
focus on a few areas in which state courts have been particularly active. Thus, the goal is
not to locate all state voting rights cases but instead to explain, through a representative
sample, how state court analyses diverge on constitutional interpretation of the right to
vote.
That said, I have attempted to uncover all reported state court cases from 2000–2015
involving voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and the voting process, so long as the court’s
decision included constitutional analysis on the right to vote. This methodology is
necessarily under-inclusive, as it contains only cases reported on Westlaw, but it represents
enough cases—over thirty—to engage in a holistic discussion of how state courts define
and shape the conferral of voting rights within state constitutions.
72 See generally Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631
(2007).
73 See Niraj Chokshi, Eight States Have Photo Voter ID Laws Similar to the One
Struck Down in Wisconsin, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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intense litigation, with some state courts upholding their state’s voter ID law
and others striking it down. Underlying most decisions sustaining a voter ID
law is a constricted interpretation of the state-based constitutional right to vote
that simply follows narrow federal jurisprudence. By contrast, courts that have
invalidated strict voter ID requirements often give independent, broader force
to the state constitution’s explicit conferral of the right to vote.
One reason state courts have been so active in this area is that the U.S.
Supreme Court already spoke on the issue in its 2008 decision in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board.74 In that case, the Court rejected a federal
constitutional challenge to Indiana’s voter ID law, holding that the law, on its
face, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.75 The three-member plurality opinion narrowly construed the
federal constitutional protection for voting rights, ruling that the plaintiffs
could not show that Indiana’s voter ID law amounted to a “substantial” or
“severe” burden on the right to vote.76 Because the law did not impose a
“severe” burden, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny review but instead
employed a lower level balancing test, which is more deferential to a state’s
role in regulating elections.77 The Court compared the state’s interests with the
alleged infringement on the right to vote and found that the state interest was
high and the burden on voters low.78 In essence, the Court closed the door to a
federal constitutional challenge to voter ID laws unless the voter-plaintiffs
have very strong evidence of how the law, as applied, severely impedes
particular people from voting.
After Crawford, states, likely emboldened by the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision, began enacting stricter voter ID laws, especially in states with
conservative-led legislatures.79 Voting rights advocates then turned their
attention to state courts and state sources of the right to vote, challenging these
voter ID laws around the country under state constitutions.80 The results have
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/04/29/eight-states-have-photo-voter-id-laws-similar-to-the-one-struckdown-in-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/QS8H-DAGM] (noting that thirty-one states had
some form of a voter ID law).
74 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion).
75 Id. at 202–04.
76 See id. at 198, 202–03.
77 Id. at 190 (applying Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), and Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). For a criticism of this deferential mode of analysis,
see Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553,
553 (2015) (“Without identifying a specific new rule, the Court has been unjustifiably
deferring to state laws regarding election administration, thereby giving states tremendous
power to regulate elections.”).
78 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202.
79 See Voter Identification Requirements/Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/5UBU-FWC7].
80 Six of the nine state court decisions involving the constitutionality of a voter ID law
came after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford. The three that pre-date
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been decidedly mixed. Of the nine state judiciaries to consider the issue
between 2004 and 2015, six have upheld voter ID laws and three have ruled
them unconstitutional.81 Of course, not all voter ID laws are the same, as they
differ regarding the kinds of identification a voter must show and how long
after an election a voter may bring an ID to the local election officials to
ensure that the final count includes the voter’s provisional ballot.82 But the
jurisprudence typically has not turned on the differences between ID
requirements among the states. Instead, the focus has been on the construction
of the state’s constitution and an assessment of the severity of the burden the
laws impose on voters. Put differently, when state courts followed Crawford’s
narrower interpretation of the right to vote, the courts usually upheld the laws,
but when courts independently construed the broader grant of voting rights in
state constitutions, they were more likely to strike down these voting
restrictions. Notably, the Crawford decision was based on the U.S.
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, not any state sources of the right to
vote. It is not binding on a challenge under a different state constitutional
provision. Nevertheless, many state courts followed Crawford even when
interpreting their state constitutions, thereby unduly narrowing the scope of the
constitutional right to vote.

1. State Courts Upholding Voter ID Laws
Six state judiciaries (in Colorado, Michigan, Indiana, Georgia, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin) have upheld voter ID laws in the past decade.
In 2004, a Colorado trial court rejected a challenge to the state’s voter ID
law in part because the law was consistent with the new federal requirement,
Crawford are from Colorado, Missouri, and Michigan. See Colo. Common Cause v.
Davidson, No. 04CV7709, 2004 WL 2360485, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004); In re
Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444,
447 (Mich. 2007); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam).
Even so, the majority of the state court activity on this issue has occurred after Crawford.
81 As of early 2016, there was also a case pending in the North Carolina state trial
court on the validity of the state’s new voter ID law. See Currie v. North Carolina,
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/CurrieV.NC.php
[https://perma.cc/7VZV-RZ5E] (last updated July 28, 2015). In 2014, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma found that a voter had standing to challenge that state’s new voter ID law and
remanded the case to the trial court. See Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd., 319 P.3d 674,
679 (Okla. 2014). These state court cases are all in addition to the federal court litigation
that continues over various states’ voter ID laws. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487,
493 (5th Cir. 2015); Alan Blinder & Ken Otterbourg, Arguments Over North
Carolina Voter ID Law Begin in Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/arguments-over-north-carolina-voter-id-law-beginin-federal-court.html [https://perma.cc/Z9VB-DC9G].
82 See Justin Levitt, Voter ID Update: The Diversity in the Details, NAT’L
CONST. CTR. (Oct 30, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/10/voter-id-updatethe-diversity-in-the-details/ [https://perma.cc/623D-TZS9] (explaining that voter ID laws
vary and using the example that “some accept student IDs . . . and some do not”).
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from the Help America Vote Act of 2002, that individuals who mail in their
voter registration forms must show some form of identification the first time
they vote.83 The court also found that the state had a sufficient justification for
the law in its attempt to root out voter fraud, concluding that “all of us must
show identification for the most mundane of reasons, and I do not believe it
likely that Plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate that Colorado’s identification
requirement is a sufficiently ‘severe’ intrusion on the right to vote to trigger
strict scrutiny.”84 Further, the court explained that the law was not “really an
identification requirement at all” because the state accepted many forms of
non-photographic ID, and voters without an ID could cast provisional ballots
that would count so long as the voter’s name appeared on one of the lists the
state used to test provisional ballots.85
Five state supreme courts have also upheld voter ID laws in recent years,
most often following federal jurisprudence on the right to vote even though the
state constitutions go further in explicitly conferring voting rights to all state
citizens.
The Michigan Supreme Court, ruling 5–2, issued an advisory opinion to
the legislature saying that the proposed voter ID law was constitutional.86 The
court invoked both the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution to find that
the law was a “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction designed to preserve
the purity of elections and to prevent abuses of the electoral franchise.”87 The
two dissenters vigorously disputed this notion, contending that although
“preventing voter fraud is an important interest in the abstract, . . . the relevant
inquiry is whether, and to what degree, in-person voter fraud would be
addressed by the photo identification requirement.”88 The dissenters found that
the law would not root out any existing fraud in Michigan elections, while at
the same time it would infringe the fundamental right to vote.89
The Indiana Supreme Court approved its state’s voter ID law by a 4–1
vote under the state constitution, holding that the meaning of the direct
conferral of voting rights under Indiana’s Constitution is the same, or in
lockstep with, the U.S. Constitution.90 The court therefore followed the U.S.
Supreme Court’s lead from its Crawford decision in upholding the law under
Indiana’s Constitution, instead of giving its state constitution the independent
and broader force that the explicit grant of the right to vote should warrant.91
83 Davidson, 2004 WL 2360485, at *10, *12–13, *15.
84 Id. at *12.
85 Id. at *13.
86 In re Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740

N.W.2d 444, 447 (Mich. 2007).
87 Id. at 448.
88 Id. at 474–77 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
89 Id.; see also id. at 487 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
90 See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 767 (Ind.
2010).
91 Id.
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The Georgia Supreme Court, by contrast, purported to give independent
meaning to its state constitution’s provision on voting rights, but it still upheld
the voter ID law by a 6–1 vote.92 The court held that the state constitution
authorized the legislature to enact the law as a “reasonable procedure for
verifying that the individual appearing to vote in person is actually the same
person who registered to vote.”93 The dissent lamented the fact that the
Georgia voter ID law “has further constricted a citizen’s ability to cast a
regular ballot at his or her polling precinct.”94
The Tennessee Supreme Court was unanimous in its voter ID ruling,
rejecting a state constitutional challenge to the law.95 The court followed a
“number of courts, including the United States Supreme Court, [which] have
rejected the notion that a state must present evidence that it has been afflicted
by voter fraud in order to enact laws pursuant to its authority to protect the
integrity of the election process.”96 Although the court claimed to be applying
strict scrutiny review, and thus purportedly was not just following Crawford
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretative method for the right to vote, it still
held that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s goals of securing
election integrity.97 This legal analysis—if genuine about using strict
scrutiny—at least could leave the door open to broader rulings on the state
constitutional right to vote; litigants simply need better evidence of the kinds
of burdens voting restrictions actually impose on voters to prevail under
heightened scrutiny.
Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued two opinions, one 5–2 and
the other 4–3, upholding the state’s voter ID law, expressly following both the
U.S. Supreme Court and these prior state court decisions.98 Initially, two
Wisconsin trial courts construed the state’s constitution as exceeding the
federal counterpart in conferring the right to vote, holding that the state’s voter
ID law imposed an impermissible qualification for voting under the Wisconsin
Constitution.99 One court explicitly distinguished Crawford by noting, “this
case is founded upon the Wisconsin Constitution which expressly guarantees
the right to vote while Crawford was based upon the U.S. Constitution which
offers no such guarantee.”100 The Wisconsin Supreme Court eventually
reversed these courts and upheld the state’s voter ID requirement, following
92 Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Ga. 2011).
93 Id. (citing GA. CONST. art. II, § I, para. I).
94 Id. at 76 (Benham, J., dissenting).
95 City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 111 (Tenn. 2013).
96 Id. at 104.
97 Id. at 104–05.
98 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 302

(Wis. 2014); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. 2014).
99 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669,
2012 WL 763586, at *8 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP
v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553, at *10 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012)
(granting motion for temporary injunction).
100 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 2012 WL 739553, at *9.
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federal jurisprudence to answer the state constitutional question and conclude
that the law did not add an additional qualification to vote and did not impose
an undue burden on voting.101 In the 5–2 decision, the court found that the
voter ID provision did not add an additional qualification to vote beyond what
the state constitution allows; in the 4–3 decision, the majority found that the
voter ID requirement was not overly burdensome.102

2. State Courts Invalidating Voter ID Laws
Within the past few years, courts in three states (Missouri, Pennsylvania,
and Arkansas) have invalidated voter ID laws under state constitutions,
recognizing that the state constitutional protection for the right to vote goes
beyond the federal constitution. These courts have therefore broadly construed
their state constitutions’ explicit conferral of voting rights.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in 2006, was the first state court to strike
down a voter ID law.103 The court held that the law violated the Missouri
Constitution’s equal protection clause and right-to-vote provision and did not
101 League of Women Voters, 851 N.W.2d at 305; Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP,
851 N.W.2d at 265.
102 League of Women Voters, 851 N.W.2d at 305; Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP,
851 N.W.2d at 265. Justice Crooks joined the majority in League of Women Voters, the
5–2 decision, but joined the dissent in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, the 4–3 ruling. He
wrote separately in League of Women Voters to explain that his decision in that case rested
largely on the fact that the plaintiffs brought only a facial challenge to the law. League of
Women Voters, 851 N.W.2d at 316 (Crooks, J., concurring). He dissented in Milwaukee
Branch of the NAACP, however, finding that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence
of specific burdens the law imposed on voters. Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, 851
N.W.2d at 282–85 (Crooks, J. dissenting).
Federal courts have also upheld the Wisconsin law. Initially, a trial court ruled that the
law was invalid under both Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842, 863
(E.D. Wis. 2014). The Seventh Circuit reversed that decision shortly before the 2014
election. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014). The Seventh Circuit then
refused to hear the case en banc, over the dissent of five judges, including Judge Richard
Posner (who had previously voted to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law in the Crawford case).
Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The U.S. Supreme Court
stayed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, so Wisconsin was not allowed to implement its voter
ID law for the 2014 election. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2014). The Supreme Court
later denied certiorari, Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551, 1551 (2015), meaning that the
federal judiciary ultimately upheld Wisconsin’s voter ID law, allowing the state to put it
into place for the 2016 election.
103 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). In 1999, a
Virginia trial court issued an injunction against the state from moving forward with a “pilot
program” in which it would require voters to show identification in ten jurisdictions.
Democratic Party of Va. v. State Bd. of Elections, No. HK-1788, 1999 WL 1318834, at *2
(Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 1999). Although the court noted that the pilot program raised
significant issues regarding the constitutional right to vote, it did not actually rule on the
constitutionality of the voter ID law. Id.
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satisfy strict scrutiny.104 More specifically, the court found that although
combating voter fraud was a compelling state interest, the voter ID law was
not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.105 In conducting its analysis, the
court took pains to explain that the Missouri Constitution gives broad
protection to voting as a fundamental right, thus focusing on the state source of
the right to vote as independent from the federal constitution.106
The fate of the voter ID requirement in Pennsylvania took a circuitous
route—with a state trial judge initially upholding the law,107 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court vacating that decision,108 and then the trial court putting the
law on hold for the upcoming election109—before a different trial judge finally
struck down the law under the state constitution.110 Underlying the
Pennsylvania trial court’s final decision invalidating the law was the notion
that
As a constitutional prerequisite, any voter ID law must contain a mechanism
for ensuring liberal access to compliant photo IDs so that the requirement of
photo ID does not disenfranchise valid voters. In other words, a state cannot
require (A) proof of identification, (photo ID), without also mandating (B),
the government provide the new proof of identification.111

The court thus found that the voter ID law violated the state constitution’s
conferral of the “fundamental right to vote.”112 It gave primacy to the notion
that all voters should have easy access to the ballot without significant
hindrance from state-imposed voter restrictions. The Governor announced that
he would not appeal this decision, meaning that the opponents of voter ID
ultimately prevailed, through state courts and under the state constitution, in
eliminating Pennsylvania’s strict voter ID requirement.113
Finally, an Arkansas trial court construed its state constitution as going
beyond the federal constitution, ruling that the state’s voter ID law imposed an
additional “qualification” to vote beyond what the Arkansas Constitution
104 Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 204.
105 Id. at 204–05.
106 See id. at 211 (“The express constitutional protection of the right to vote

differentiates the Missouri constitution from its federal counterpart.”).
107 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376, at *32 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Aug. 15, 2012), vacated, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam).
108 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5–6 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam).
109 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012).
110 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *27 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014).
111 Id. at *18.
112 Id. at *24.
113 See Dave Warner, Pennsylvania Governor Drops Court Fight for Voter ID Law,
REUTERS (May 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/us-usa-voteridpennsylvania-idUSBREA4800N20140509 [https://perma.cc/XE6D-ZZ59].
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permits.114 The Arkansas Supreme Court, in affirming, also recognized the
primacy and independence of the state constitution’s conferral of voting
rights.115 The court found that the four voter qualifications listed in the
Arkansas Constitution (U.S. citizenship, Arkansas resident, over 18, and
lawfully registered) “simply do not include any proof-of-identity
requirement.”116 The court also rejected reliance on Crawford or cases from
other jurisdictions by explaining that “those courts interpreted the United
States Constitution or their respective states’ constitutions, and here, we
address the present issue solely under the Arkansas Constitution”117—even
though the language of the Arkansas Constitution is not materially different
from that of other states. The court’s analysis exemplifies a broader
interpretation of the constitutional right to vote under the state constitution.
This analysis does not mean that all voter ID laws are inherently suspect
under state constitutions. The question is whether an ID law is so restrictive
that it adds, in essence, an additional “qualification” for voting that not all
citizens can satisfy easily. Many states have failed to ensure universal
possession of qualifying IDs or otherwise provided alternatives to those who
do not have them. In these states, the voter ID law is tantamount to an
additional qualification that precludes some people from voting. As the
Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Arkansas cases show, a broad construction of
state constitutional language conferring the right to vote leads to the
invalidation of these stricter ID requirements.
In sum, since 2004, state courts in nine states have rendered important
decisions regarding voter identification. Courts that have interpreted their state
constitutions to be in “lockstep,” or co-extensive, with the federal constitution,
or that otherwise followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s Crawford decision,
upheld the laws. Their analysis exemplifies an unduly narrow view of the
explicit conferral of voting rights in state constitutions. By contrast, courts that
properly understood the state constitutional right to vote broadly as going
beyond federal protection invalidated the voting restrictions.118

B. Felon Disenfranchisement
State courts have also been significant in the debate over felon
disenfranchisement, with some courts broadly construing the right to vote for
114 See Andrew DeMillo, AP, Group Asks Judge to Halt Arkansas Voter-ID Law,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (June 24, 2014), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2014/
jun/24/group-asks-judge-halt-arkansas-voter-id-law/ [https://perma.cc/9ARN-TBN5]. The
judge had issued a prior decision invalidating the law, but the state supreme court reversed
that decision on procedural grounds. See Ark. State Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. Pulaski
Cty. Election Comm’n, 437 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Ark. 2014).
115 Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Ark. 2014).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 853.
118 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 105–19.
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felons and thereby limiting the reach of laws that disenfranchise them, and
other courts ruling more narrowly on the voting rights issue to uphold the
restrictions. The U.S. Supreme Court last considered the topic in 1985,119 but
several federal appellate courts have issued rulings recently on felon
disenfranchisement, rejecting challenges to state laws under the federal Voting
Rights Act or the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.120 But plaintiffs
have prevailed in some state courts, particularly when they have convinced
state judges to construe the right to vote broadly and thus limit the reach of
felon disenfranchisement laws. These cases provide another example of how a
robust state court analysis of the right to vote can overcome undue voting
restrictions, thereby including more people in the electorate.
For instance, a California appellate court ruled that the California
Constitution’s delegation to the legislature to “provide for the disqualification
of electors while . . . imprisoned or on parole for the conviction of a felony”121
did not apply to those prisoners “incarcerated in a local detention facility for
the conviction of a felony, including persons serving that term as a condition
of probation.”122 As part of its ruling, the court applied a canon of construction
in favor of broader voting rights, stating,
[i]n the absence of any clear intent by the Legislature or the voters, we apply
the principle that “[t]he exercise of the franchise is one of the most important
functions of good citizenship, and no construction of an election law should
be indulged that would disenfranchise any voter if the law is reasonably
susceptible of any other meaning.”123

119 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating Alabama felon
disenfranchisement law because it was passed with racial animus); see also Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding California felon disenfranchisement law under
the Reduction in Representation Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
120 See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per
curiam) (rejecting challenge to felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act);
Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a provision of the
Mississippi Constitution that prohibits felons from voting does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 154 (2d
Cir. 2010) (rejecting challenge to New York felon disenfranchisement law under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir.
2009) (rejecting challenge to felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act);
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 309 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (same); Johnson v. Governor
of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same). Notably, many of these
cases were close en banc decisions with vigorous dissents, suggesting that, although
plaintiffs have not yet prevailed in federal court, the proper resolution of the issue is far
from clear. See, e.g., Hayden, 449 F.3d at 343 (Parker, J., dissenting); id. at 367
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
121 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4.
122 League of Women Voters of Cal. v. McPherson, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 588 (Ct.
App. 2006).
123 Id. at 594 (quoting Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417–18 (Cal. 1966)).
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Other courts also have limited the reach of a state’s felon
disenfranchisement law by invoking a broader analysis of state voting rights.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, for example, invalidated the state’s decision to
disenfranchise an individual who was convicted of homicide when the state
had not listed homicide as an “infamous crime” at the time he committed the
offense.124 The court explained that “[o]ur Constitution guarantees its citizenry
the right to vote pursuant to article I, section 5, protecting all except those
convicted of infamous crimes. That the entitlement is preserved in the
Constitution rather than by legislative enactment underscores its importance to
the people.”125 Essential to the court’s analysis was the principle that the right
to vote is fundamental and robust, even for felons, and therefore that the
legislature may take that right away only pursuant to constitutional authority.
Disenfranchising the defendant based on a conviction for a crime that was not
“infamous” constituted a view of voting rights that was too narrow, leading to
an impermissible “restraint on liberty.”126
The Iowa Supreme Court also limited the reach of its state’s felon
disenfranchisement law by finding that an aggravated misdemeanor offense of
“operating while intoxicated” was not an “infamous crime” under the state
constitution.127 The plurality opinion held that a crime is “infamous” only if it
is one “that reveals that voters who commit the crime would tend to undermine
the process of democratic governance through elections.”128 The court thereby
narrowed the state’s disenfranchisement provision and, in the process,
emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to vote.129
But plaintiffs challenging felon disenfranchisement laws have not seen
universal success in state courts, especially when the courts fail to construe
voting rights broadly. The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, held that the
state was justified in disenfranchising, during the time of his incarceration, an
individual convicted of misdemeanor battery pursuant to the legislature’s
general police power to deprive convicted prisoners of the right to vote while
they are in jail.130 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that to
regain voting rights, a felon who had served his or her full prison sentence still
124 May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 345–48 (Tenn. 2008).
125 Id. at 346 (footnote omitted).
126 Id. at 345–47. The Tennessee Supreme Court also construed its state constitution’s

conferral of the right to vote broadly in the voter ID context even though it upheld that law.
See supra note 95.
127 Chiodo v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 847, 857 (Iowa 2014). The court
was fractured, with three justices in the plurality, two concurring justices, and one dissent.
Id. at 846.
128 Id. at 856.
129 See id. at 848, 856.
130 Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 785 (Ind. 2011). The court found that the state
could not disenfranchise an individual solely based on his misdemeanor battery conviction,
as that offense did not constitute an “infamous crime” under the Indiana Constitution’s
Infamous Crimes Clause. Id. at 782. But the holding still sanctioned the state’s broader
felon disenfranchisement rule for anyone in jail. Id.
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must repay the entire amount of his or her “legal financial obligations.”131 The
court employed a lockstep132 analysis—in which it simply followed the U.S.
Constitution and federal jurisprudence on the issue—to conclude that the
Washington Constitution “does not provide greater protection of voting rights
for felons than does the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.”133
Ultimately, the majority held that the right to vote is not a fundamental right
for felons.134
Given that many state constitutions have sanctioned felon
disenfranchisement for years,135 there is often no plausible state-based legal
argument against the laws. Nevertheless, a narrower view of the constitutional
right to vote helps states in their attempt to justify and even expand their felon
disenfranchisement provisions. A broader interpretation of the right to vote
under state constitutions, by contrast, leads state courts to cabin the reach of
these laws.

C. Voting Process
State judges routinely regulate the rules of the voting process, rendering
decisions on a wide range of issues such as the kinds of machines voters use
and the procedures for accepting absentee ballots. When things go awry on
Election Day, state judges decide whether to extend polling hours. Through
these opinions, which all involve Election Day or post-election mechanics,
state courts play a vital role in dictating the meaning and scope of the
constitutional right to vote. Sometimes the decisions broadly construe the right
to vote and open up the process to more people, while other times the opinions
are narrow and ultimately make voting harder.

131 Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 761 (Wash. 2007).
132 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining the lockstep approach).
133 Madison, 163 P.3d at 766.
134 Id. at 768. In a subsequent decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that the

state could continue to disenfranchise, during the period of his civil confinement, a person
who was convicted of being a sexual predator, giving primacy to the legislature’s
constitutional authority to impose felon disenfranchisement over the constitution’s explicit
conferral of the right to vote. See State v. Donaghe, 256 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Wash. 2011).
135 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 50 (rev. ed. 2009) (explaining that “[s]tates began to
incorporate criminal disfranchisement provisions into their constitutions during the early
years of the republic”); see also William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 617 (2007)
(noting that “by the eve of the Civil War some two dozen states had statutes barring felons
from voting or had felon disenfranchisement provisions in their state constitutions”
(quoting Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777,
781 (2002))).

2016]

STATE JUDGES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE

25

1. Voting Machines
In recent years, state courts around the country have issued opinions on the
constitutionality of new electronic voting machines. Although most state
judges have rejected these challenges and elevated the role of states in
regulating the election process, at least one state court emphasized the
importance of the constitutional right to vote and suggested that the problems
that might arise with these new machines could potentially infringe that right.
After the 2000 presidential election debacle in Florida, Congress enacted
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which provided funds to states and
localities to replace outdated voting equipment.136 Many states purchased new
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), or touch-screen, voting machines. Some
voters then challenged the use of these machines as infringing on their rights,
alleging that the machines prevented some people from casting an effective
vote or having their ballot count. Plaintiffs initially challenged the DRE
machines in federal court, arguing that they violated equal protection by
treating voters who use them differently from voters who use paper ballots.137
But after the federal courts rejected these claims, plaintiffs turned to state
courts.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in rejecting a challenge to Georgia’s DRE
machines, narrowly construed the Georgia Constitution’s right-to-vote
provision to go only as far as federal jurisprudence.138 The plaintiffs argued
that the state’s use of electronic voting machines, instead of paper ballots,
violated their fundamental right to vote because the state was not protecting
the DRE machines from fraudulent manipulation through the use of an
independent audit trail or county and state tabulators.139 The court, following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to vote, found that the
DRE machines did not burden voters and therefore did not require strict
scrutiny review, the highest form of judicial inquiry.140 By employing a lower
level of scrutiny, the court deferred to the state’s assertion of its “important
regulatory interests” in implementing the law.141 Implicit in this analysis is a
narrower construction of the state-based constitutional right to vote in favor of
state regulation of the voting process.
The Texas Supreme Court, aligning with the Georgia case and federal
court opinions, also rejected a challenge to DRE machines.142 The plaintiffs
136 Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (2012)).
137 See Tex. Democratic Party v. Williams, 285 F. App’x 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam); Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1227 (11th Cir. 2006); Weber v. Shelley,
347 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2003).
138 Favorito v. Handel, 684 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Ga. 2009).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 261–62.
141 Id. at 262.
142 Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2011).
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alleged that the use of the DRE machines violated the state constitution’s grant
of the right to vote.143 Specifically, they argued that paper ballots are less
subject to fraud or manipulation than electronic machines, and that voters who
use the electronic machines are denied the right to a hand recount of votes if a
recount is necessary, thereby devaluing the votes of those who use the DRE
technology.144 The court rejected these arguments, holding that the DRE
machines did not “impose severe restrictions on voters, particularly in light of
the significant benefits such machines offer.”145 Part of that analysis included
a limiting construction of the state constitution’s conferral of voting rights to
all citizens.
But an Arizona appellate court took a different tact, elevating the
importance of the constitutional right to vote in analyzing this question.146
Various plaintiffs with disabilities challenged Arizona’s new DRE machines,
alleging that they were inaccurate, inaccessible for voters with disabilities, and
subject to vote manipulation.147 An appellate court reversed a trial court
decision that had dismissed the lawsuit, stating that the plaintiffs had presented
sufficient evidence that the machines might violate both the state constitution
and state statutes to allow the suit to move forward.148 The court concluded
that “Arizona’s constitutional right to a ‘free and equal’ election is implicated
when votes are not properly counted,” and that there was a risk that the new
DRE machines might not correctly record and tabulate the votes.149
In sum, most state courts have rejected challenges to DRE machines and
narrowly construed their state constitutions in the process, but the Arizona
court is an exception. That court’s analysis demonstrates how questions
involving the efficacy of the vote casting and counting process can implicate
the broader grant of the right to vote within state constitutions.

2. Extending Polling Hours on Election Day
On Election Day itself, state courts are often involved in decisions
regarding whether to extend the polling hours because of some issue or
malfunction. Lengthening the polling time in the event of a problem obviously
makes it easier for some people to vote; strictly following the closing deadline
143 Id. at 11.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 14.
146 Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
147 Id. at 401–02.
148 Id. at 408–09.
149 Id. at 408. The plaintiffs did not pursue the litigation on remand because key

witnesses either disappeared or could not testify on the specific points at issue. See E-mail
from Clair Wendt, Sec’y for Paul F. Eckstein, Perkins Coie, to Patrick Barsotti, Research
Assistant for Joshua A. Douglas, Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Assoc.
Professor of Law, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (July 1, 2014, 20:17 EST) (on file with author)
(explaining the status of the litigation of Chavez v. Brewer following the appellate court
decision).
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might, in some circumstances, unduly shut people out of the democratic
process, thereby infringing on their constitutional right to vote. Further,
appellate courts that reverse a trial court decision to extend polling hours
inherently interfere with the trial judge’s broader, on-the-ground determination
of how best to effectuate the constitutional right to vote for all citizens.
During the 2000 presidential election dispute, the decisions of the Florida
Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore grabbed all of the
headlines, but a ruling from a Missouri appellate court was also significant.
The Gore campaign had successfully obtained an order from a Missouri trial
judge to extend the polling hours in some St. Louis precincts until 10:00 p.m.,
three hours after the statutory closing time, due to extremely long lines
throughout the day that were preventing some people from voting.150 The
Bush campaign convinced an appellate court to reverse that ruling.151 As part
of its written order issued a month later, the court of appeals explained the
dilemma facing state trial judges on Election Day:
We recognize that in the heat of a closely-contested election campaign, trial
judges may be called upon to make difficult decisions with little time for
deliberation. Where fundamental rights are at stake, such pressures are
magnified. But commendable zeal to protect voting rights must be tempered
by the corresponding duty to protect the integrity of the voting process.
Courts should not hesitate to vigorously enforce the election laws so that
every properly registered voter has the opportunity to vote. But equal
vigilance is required to ensure that only those entitled to vote are allowed to
cast a ballot. Otherwise, the rights of those lawfully entitled to vote are
inevitably diluted.152

A similar issue arose during the 2002 election in Arkansas, with the
Democratic Party obtaining an emergency order from a trial court judge to
extend the polling hours from 7:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. in one Arkansas county,
only later to have the Arkansas Supreme Court reverse that decision.153 The
judge issued the order extending polling hours because the county did not have
sufficient voting booths, voting rolls, or other supplies and equipment, with
ballots being depleted during the day at three precincts.154 These deficiencies
had the tangible effect of taking away the right to vote for some people. But
the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the order later that evening, ruling that
the Arkansas election law requiring polls to close at 7:30 p.m. was clear and
mandatory.155 The decision was initially 6–0 with one justice not participating,
but two days later the court issued a 4–3 per curiam decision with one
150 State ex rel. Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc. v. Baker, 34 S.W.3d 410, 411 (Mo. Ct. App.

2000).

151 Id. at 412–13.
152 Id.
153 Republican Party of Ark. v. Kilgore, 98 S.W.3d 798, 798 (Ark. 2002) (per curiam).
154 Id. at 798–99.
155 Id. at 800 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-304 (Repl. 2000)).
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concurrence and three dissenting opinions.156 The dissenters argued that the
court did not have proper appellate jurisdiction over the case and therefore that
the court should not have interfered with the trial judge’s decision.157
Judges throughout the country regularly extend polling hours in extreme
circumstances without facing reversal from appellate courts. In 2014, a
Connecticut judge ordered two voting locations in Hartford to remain open for
an additional half hour because, earlier in the day, those precincts were
missing voter registration information.158 In 2010, a New Hampshire judge
extended the polling time by one hour because there had been a shooting in the
town, which had resulted in a lockdown of a local school that the town was
using as a polling place.159 Similarly, a Maryland judge extended the polling
hours in 2006 in Montgomery County due to a glitch in the county’s electronic
voting machines.160 Two years later, a Maryland judge extended the polling
time by ninety minutes due to a severe ice storm.161 During the 1990 election,
a North Carolina judge lengthened the voting time by one hour due to long
lines throughout the day.162 These are just a few examples; in every election
cycle there are news reports of state judges lengthening polling hours to
respond to some problem with the voting process.163 These last-minute
decisions to extend voting hours do not always result in published written
156 Id. at 798–99; id. at 801 (Hannah, J., concurring).
157 See id. at 802–03 (Glaze, J., dissenting); id. at 804 (Corbin, J., dissenting); id. at

805 (Clinton Imber, J., dissenting). The dissenters lamented:
Never in this court’s history since 1836 has this court heard and decided an appeal or
petition for a writ without the parties having filed a notice of appeal, record, and briefs
so the court could deliberate properly to consider both the merits of the lower court’s
decision and its authority to have decided the case in controversy.

Id. at 803 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Another justice who initially voted to reverse but then
dissented from the written opinion wrote that on Election Day he had “acted improvidently
in this matter” and that he was “truly embarrassed.” Id. at 804 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
158 See Polls Close Across Connecticut, NBC CONN. (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Voters-Report-Problems-at-Polls-281425521.html
[https://perma.cc/XF9N-WYTX].
159 Press Release, N.H. Att’y Gen., Town of Pittsburg Polling Places to Stay Open to
8:00 PM (Nov. 4, 2010) (available through the Federal News Service).
160 Debbi Wilgoren, Montgomery to Extend Voting Hours After Election Glitches,
WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/
technology/2006/09/12/montgomery-to-extend-voting-hours-after-election-glitches/5a0a55c0
-7a52-4212-a9c3-44610150443b/ [https://perma.cc/P6P8-DHH3].
161 Eric M. Weiss & Joshua Zumbrun, Icy Rain Ties Up Traffic, Causes Dangerous
Ride to the Polls, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/02/12/ST2008021202302.html [https://perma.cc/H4WM-X2YW].
162 See Democratic Party of Guilford Cty. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 467
S.E.2d 681, 682–83 (N.C. 1996).
163 See, e.g., Christine Hauser & John Holusha, Problems Lead 8 States to Extend
Some Voting Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/08/
world/americas/08iht-web.1108day.3441243.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2CKXWFVX].
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opinions or national media coverage, yet they impact meaningfully the
conduct of the election and thus the constitutional right to vote.164
Broadly construing voting rights does not mean that judges should always
extend polling hours; plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that there is a
significant problem that will actually impede some people from voting without
the additional time. As these examples demonstrate, state trial judges, when
faced with an Election Day problem, often broadly interpret the right to vote
so as to ensure that everyone has a reasonable chance to exercise that right on
Election Day.165

3. Complying with Rules for Casting a Ballot
The rules for casting ballots are also fodder for state court involvement in
the voting process, especially in an election contest when the determination of
who won may come down to those votes.166 Once again, a state judge’s
construction of the constitutional right to vote as either broad or narrow often
determines whether many individuals are able to participate in our democracy.
In perhaps the most well-known example, the Minnesota Supreme Court
resolved the 2008 U.S. Senate election over seven months after Election Day
by ruling that absentee voters must “strictly” comply with the statutory
requirements for voting via absentee ballot.167 The court refused to adopt a
more lenient “substantial compliance” standard instead.168 The ruling, which
certified Democrat Al Franken as the winner, was narrow with respect to
voting rights because it meant that some voters did not have their votes count
if they had not complied with the precise rules for casting absentee ballots.169
164 Federal courts, too, have issued rulings extending polling hours on Election Day.
See, e.g., Amended Order, Obama for Am. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:08CV-00562 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2008). Nevertheless, a search of judicial opinions and news
reports reveals much more state court than federal court activity on this issue. See generally
Robert C. O’Brien et al., Election Day Challenges to Polling Hours and the Judiciary’s
Cautious Response, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2009) (citing mostly state court cases and
news articles involving state judges extending polling hours).
165 A state court decision regarding the extension of polling hours was the subject of an
academic simulation of a hypothetical election contest in 2008 between John McCain and
Barack Obama to test the mechanisms for resolving a post-election dispute over the
presidency. See Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A Fair Tribunal for
Disputed Presidential Elections, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 472–74 (2010).
166 For an overview of the procedures for resolving post-election disputes in all fifty
states, see Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1
(2013).
167 Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam).
168 Id.
169 See id. For a discussion of the Minnesota recount and court rulings, see Edward B.
Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10
ELECTION L.J. 129 (2011). Professor Justin Levitt has noted that, even though the
Minnesota Supreme Court rested on a “strict compliance” standard for absentee voters, the
application of that standard was actually more lenient. See Justin Levitt, Resolving Election
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In a similar holding that commanded strict compliance with voting rules,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the requirement that nondisabled
absentee voters hand deliver their ballots themselves was “mandatory.”170 The
court employed this strict reading of state law in spite of the fact that the
Allegheny County Board of Elections had issued a declaration before the
election sanctioning the long-standing practice of allowing third parties to
deliver others’ absentee ballots.171 The court held that “so-called technicalities
of the Election Code are necessary for the preservation of secrecy and the
sanctity of the ballot and must therefore be observed—particularly where, as
here, they are designed to reduce fraud.”172 This narrow ruling on the
constitutional right to vote meant that fifty-six voters who had complied with
the election officials’ stated rules for casting absentee ballots were
disenfranchised, potentially affecting the outcome of at least one race.173
The Alabama Supreme Court also required voters to comply strictly with
the rules for absentee balloting, refusing to allow voters to cure the defects
after Election Day in an election contest.174 The court held that “to count the
votes of voters who fail to comply with the essential requirement of submitting
proper identification with their absentee ballots would have the effect of
disenfranchising qualified electors who choose not to vote rather than to make
the effort to comply with the absentee-voting requirements.”175 These cases
demonstrate the manner in which state courts have issued opinions narrowly
construing the right to vote, either on constitutional or statutory grounds,
thereby constricting who is able to participate in the election.
By contrast, a Tennessee appellate court broadly interpreted a Tennessee
statute regulating how much time a voter may spend in the voting booth so as
to effectuate an individual’s constitutional right to vote.176 The statute at issue
limited a voter to five minutes in the voting booth if other voters were waiting
and otherwise to a maximum of ten minutes.177 The evidence showed that,
because of a lengthy ballot and some precincts using new machines, there
were long lines on Election Day.178 Almost half of all voters took longer than
five minutes to vote, while five percent took longer than ten minutes.179 The
Error: The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 127–28
(2012). Nevertheless, the court’s ruling itself was narrow with respect to the counting of
ballots because the court explicitly adopted the “strict compliance” standard. See id.
170 In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223,
1234 (Pa. 2004).
171 Id. at 1226–27.
172 Id. at 1234.
173 Id. at 1225.
174 Townson v. Stonicher, 933 So. 2d 1062, 1065–66 (Ala. 2005).
175 Id.
176 Stuart v. Anderson Cty. Election Comm’n, 300 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
177 Id. at 689 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-118 (Supp. 2008)).
178 Id.
179 Id.

2016]

STATE JUDGES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE

31

court rejected the losing candidate’s argument that this evidence demonstrated
that illegal votes tainted the election, noting that the voters’ failure to comply
with the time limit was not a “serious” violation of the statute.180 Quoting the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the court explained, “[T]echnical non-conformity
with election statutes will not necessarily void an election, as ‘such strictness
would lead to defeat rather than uphold, popular election, and can not be
maintained.’”181 The court also rejected the losing candidate’s second
argument that the election officials’ failure to follow precisely a Tennessee
election statute requiring voters to show “other evidence of identification”
made these votes “illegal.”182 The parties stipulated that everyone who had
voted was properly registered to do so, meaning that the failure to ask for
“other evidence of identification” did not have any practical effect, even
though it was technically a violation of the statute.183 Thus, the decision
placed paramount importance on an individual’s constitutional right to vote
rather than mandating strict compliance with the election statutes. But it
contrasts with the opinions discussed above that required strict compliance
with election rules, even if that meant the disenfranchisement of some voters.
*

*

*

This Part has discussed over thirty state court cases, issued within the last
decade, that have impacted elections and the constitutional right to vote. But it
focused on only three issues: voter ID, felon disenfranchisement, and rules
about the voting process. This analysis barely scratches the surface of electionrelated decisions state courts render every year. State judges issue opinions on
a wide range of election law topics, such as voter registration,184
redistricting,185 ballot access,186 and campaign finance,187 to name just a few
180 Id. at 690 (quoting King v. Sevier Cty. Election Comm’n, 282 S.W.3d 37 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2008)).
181 Id. at 689 (alteration in original) (quoting Forbes v. Bell, 816 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn.
1991)).
182 Stuart, 300 S.W.3d at 690.
183 Id. at 691.
184 See Guare v. State, 117 A.3d 731 (N.H. 2015) (per curiam) (invalidating new
language on voter registration form that conflated domicile and residency).
185 See, e.g., In re 2012 Legislative Districting, 80 A.3d 1073 (Md. 2013) (holding that
the new redistricting plan did not violate the state constitution, federal constitution, or
Voting Rights Act); Maestas v. Hall, 274 P.3d 66 (N.M. 2012) (holding that the lower
court erred in adopting the particular redistricting plan for the state legislature).
186 See, e.g., Nader for President 2004 v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 926 A.2d 199
(Md. 2007) (broadly construing state ballot access rules under the state constitution to
allow ballot access); Walsh v. Katz, 953 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 2011) (strictly construing ballot
access rules and thereby denying ballot access to candidate).
187 See, e.g., Colo. Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, 269 P.3d 1248 (Colo. 2012)
(interpreting campaign finance provision of Colorado Constitution); State v. Green
Mountain Future, 86 A.3d 981 (Vt. 2013) (upholding disclosure requirements for political
action committees).
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examples. Just as with cases involving the right to vote, the analysis often
differs between states, with some courts issuing broad opinions and other
courts more narrowly construing the rules for participating in our democracy.
Most of these cases receive little media attention or public scrutiny, even
when the states’ highest courts issue the opinions, and yet they play a
significant role in how elections operate. On a theoretical level, the cases are
inherently important because they define the scope of the right to vote, which
ultimately comes from state constitutions. Practically, the decisions quite
literally alter the electorate, and therefore, the election.
Understanding how different judges define the meaning of democratic
participation, either broadly or narrowly, will give us better tools for
protecting the right to vote as robustly as possible. Litigants can use the
comparative analysis to influence courts by showing how some judges have
properly given independent meaning to their state constitutions and thereby
broadly construed the individual right to vote, while other judges have gone
astray in following a narrower federal interpretation. That is, a comparative
analysis of the overall approach to the constitutional right to vote can assist
litigants in arguing for broader protection under a state’s constitution.
The scholarly and advocacy community can also go a step further. We
should include, as part of the ongoing conversation regarding the kinds of
judges we want deciding these cases, evidence of how state judges impact the
constitutional right to vote. Do we want judges who will narrowly construe
voting rights while elevating the role of states in regulating elections? Or do
we want judges who will apply a legal canon that is broader and more
inclusive in how it evaluates the constitutional right to vote? The next Part
contributes to that conversation by examining some features of judicial
ideology and judicial selection that might correlate with these approaches.

IV. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY, JUDICIAL SELECTION, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE
As the previous Part highlighted, in every election cycle state courts are
intimately involved in construing the scope and meaning of the constitutional
right to vote. Our attention to these cases, as well as the selection process for
the judges who decide them, should be correspondingly robust.
Beyond simply understanding the cases themselves, we can use them to
contribute to the already-robust debate over who we choose to be our state
judges and how we select them.188 This Part first offers some initial thoughts
on how judicial ideology might affect a judge’s rulings on voting rights issues.
188 There are scores of law review articles considering the merits of electing versus
appointing state judges. For a small sample of that debate, see, for example, Monroe H.
Freedman, The Unconstitutionality of Electing State Judges, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217
(2013); F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate
of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(1999); Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077
(2007).
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It then provides some preliminary analysis on how the method of judicial
selection correlates, at least for certain issues, with a judge’s views on the
constitutional right to vote. None of the findings are definitive, as they are
based on simple observations and not quantitative empirical analysis. But they
still provide preliminary, anecdotal data that can supplement the existing
scholarly debate on these issues.

A. Judicial Ideology and the Right to Vote
Liberal judges tend to view individual rights broadly, granting fuller
protection to plaintiffs asserting these rights against state regulation, while
conservative judges usually analyze them more narrowly. Of course, ideology
is not the only driver of judicial decision-making, as legal analysis is based on
law, precedent, and the facts of a particular case.189 That said, ideology often
correlates with the outcome in a case, especially on highly partisan issues such
as election law and voting rights.190 It should come as no surprise, then, that a
judge’s analysis of the constitutional right to vote often correlates with his or
her ideology.191
The link between ideology and interpretation of the constitutional right to
vote is most poignant in decisions on voter ID laws.192 Most (although not all)
of the state judges ruling on voter ID laws in the past decade have followed
189 See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Partisanship Suppressed: Judicial Decision-Making in
Ralph Nader’s 2004 Ballot Access Litigation, 7 ELECTION L.J. 301, 302 (2008) (finding
that “partisanship did not have a systematic effect on judicial behavior in Nader’s 2004
ballot access litigation”).
190 See, e.g., Kyle Casimir Kopko, The Effect of Partisanship in Election Law Judicial
Decision-Making, at iii (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University),
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?217393141997567::NO:10:P10_ETD_SUBID:71773 [https://
perma.cc/T9UA-3AFZ] (finding a relationship between the ideology of federal judges and
their rulings on campaign finance cases, and a “conditional partisanship” effect in
redistricting cases depending on the composition of the three-judge court hearing the
dispute).
191 Prior empirical studies have shown that liberal and conservative judges rule
differently on various election law issues. For example, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas
Miles have found that ideology, based on the partisanship of the appointing President,
correlates strongly with how a federal judge rules in a Voting Rights Act case. See Adam
B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19–25
(2008). Similarly, Professors Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd have found that state
judges’ rulings are often consistent with the views of the political parties that funded their
election campaigns. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 1243–44.
192 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643,
647 (2008) (considering both federal and state voter ID decisions and finding that, as of
2008, “there have been fourteen votes by Democratic judges against the constitutionality of
photo-ID requirements, and only three votes indicating that the requirement at issue is
permissible. For Republican judges, the respective numbers are three (against
constitutionality) and fifteen (for constitutionality).” (footnote omitted)).
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their ideological predilections. Liberal judges most often construe the
constitutional right to vote broadly and therefore view voter ID laws
skeptically, while conservative judges tend to do the opposite.193
Most of the Missouri Supreme Court judges194 in the 6–1 majority that
invalidated the state’s voter ID law had liberal backgrounds.195 Democratic
193 See Hasen, supra note 27, at 106. An important caveat is required here: I am not

attempting a quantitative empirical analysis, and the sample size is relatively small, so the
conclusions are necessarily tentative. Also, the direction of influence is unclear: does
ideology affect the decision, or is the decision simply evidence of the judge’s ideology?
But the analysis at least provides a first step in showing that the political identity of the
judges may matter when deciding a voting rights controversy.
194 Under the Missouri Constitution, only the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme
Court is referred to as a “Justice.” The other members of the Court are referred to as
“Judges.” See MO. CONST. art V, §§ 2, 8; see also Supreme Court Judges, YOUR MO. CTS.,
http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133 [https://perma.cc/D5QG-7ZDL].
Technically, Missouri judges are nonpartisan, appointed pursuant to the “Missouri
Plan” under which a nonpartisan commission generates a list of three names and the
Governor appoints someone from that list. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a). Thereafter the
judges face nonpartisan retention elections. Id. § 25(c)(1). Nevertheless, because the
Governor is a political actor, the selection of Missouri’s Supreme Court Judges is not as
nonpartisan as it might seem. See, e.g., Show Me the Judges, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 30,
2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118843325339812916 [https://perma.cc/SBF9-D2W7]
(“An ostensibly non-partisan seven-member commission chooses a slate of three nominees
and the Governor chooses among them. The idea was to produce candidates based on merit
while diluting political influence over courts. But that was then. Anybody with the power
to choose judicial candidates was also destined to become a political actor. And that’s
exactly what happened.”); see also Hans A. Linde, Selecting Oregon’s Judges, 33 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 671, 678 (2010) (suggesting that the current operation of the Missouri Plan
“leaves governors to find back channels to get one name or another on the commission’s
list”).
195 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam). Chief Justice
Michael A. Wolff (who became the Dean of St. Louis University School of Law), a
member of the per curiam majority, ran for Attorney General as a Democrat and served as
a special counsel to Democratic Governor Mel Carnahan. See Jake
Wagman, Missouri Supreme Court Judge Michael A. Wolff to Step Down, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/
missouri-supreme-court-judge-michael-a-wolff-to-step-down/article_9588c1c2-0d3d-5b699057-9566b75a85f5.html [https://perma.cc/8R9T-W3PU]. Democratic Governors appointed
three other members of the majority: Judges Laura Denvir Stith, Richard Teitelman, and
Ronnie White. See Associated Press, Missouri Court Overturns Inmate’s Death Row
Status, S.E. MISSOURIAN (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.semissourian.com/story/107876.html
[https://perma.cc/XP89-MVCC] (listing affiliation of the Governor who appointed these
Judges). Judge Charles Blackmar, also a member of the majority, was a Senior Judge who
was appointed by Republican Governor Kit Bond and was eulogized after he died as a
Republican, yet he spent his retired years promoting stem-cell research and advocating for
the abolishment of the death penalty—both typically more liberal views. Charles Blakey
Blackmar, ’42, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. (Apr. 18. 2007), http://paw.princeton.edu/
memorials/4/7/index.xml [https://perma.cc/Q9BN-J8LX]; Michael Wolff, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Mo., Eulogy, Charles B. Blackmar: Professor, Judge, Chief
Justice ... and Charlie (Jan. 26, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/
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Governors appointed all but one of these judges; the only Republicanappointed Judge publicly supported certain issues traditionally associated with
liberal views, such as abolishing the death penalty.196 The one dissenting
Judge disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the state lacked sufficient
evidence regarding the existence of voter fraud, thereby deferring to the state’s
voting process and narrowly construing the Missouri Constitution’s express
conferral of the right to vote.197 That Judge is a noted conservative who
publicly affiliates with the Federalist Society (a conservative legal
organization).198 It is of course impossible to know whether any of these
judge’s ideological affiliations influenced their views on the voter ID law. But
regardless of the role ideology actually played in the decision, the fact is that
the liberal judges all analyzed the individual constitutional right to vote more
broadly than the conservative jurist in dissent.
The same trend appeared in Wisconsin.199 Initially, two different
Wisconsin trial courts invalidated the state’s voter ID law under the state
constitution, concluding that the Wisconsin Constitution’s conferral of the
right to vote goes beyond narrower federal jurisprudence.200 Democratic
Governor Jim Doyle appointed one of those trial court judges, Richard
page.jsp?id=4814 [https://perma.cc/AY2C-QQJQ]). The final member of the majority
decision, Judge Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, was a court of appeals judge sitting by
designation on the Missouri Supreme Court; Democratic Governor Bob Holden appointed
her to the bench. See Judge Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern
District, YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1949 [https://perma.cc/
P67G-EE9G]; Virginia Young, Judges Hear Advice on Missouri Redistricting, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/judgeshear-advice-on-missouri-redistricting/article_9562fba3-729e-5eda-bca7-f13b611776ff.html
[https://perma.cc/P67G-EE9G].
196 See Wolff, supra note 195.
197 See Weinschenk, 203 S.W.3d at 227–29 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
198 Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/
page.jsp?id=200 [https://perma.cc/LVW8-N5CM] (listing “Member, The Federalist
Society”). Judge Limbaugh is now a Judge on the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, receiving his appointment to the federal bench from
Republican President George W. Bush. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
Limbaugh, Stephen Nathaniel Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetInfo?jid=3177&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na
[https://perma.cc/BHW4-LBWB].
Judge Limbaugh is a cousin of conservative talk radio personality Rush Limbaugh. Richa
Naik, Missouri Is Creating a Bronze Statue of Rush Limbaugh, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/missouri-is-creative-a-bronze-statue-ofrush-limbaugh-2012-3 [https://perma.cc/82PR-GWCY].
199 The Wisconsin Governor appoints many judges to fill vacant seats (although they
must then run for election), so looking at the Governor’s party affiliation sheds some light
on the ideology of the judge. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States,
NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/ [https://perma.cc/5B6U-S5J7] (listing the various
judicial selection methods in all fifty states).
200 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669,
2012 WL 763586, at *8 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP
v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553, at *11 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012).
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Niess.201 Republican Governor Tommy Thompson appointed the other judge,
but after this voter ID decision, Wisconsin Republicans cried foul, claiming
that the judge was politically biased because he had previously signed the
recall petition against Republican Governor Scott Walker.202 The three-judge
appellate court that reversed Judge Niess contained two liberals and one
conservative, although the one conservative jurist actually authored the
opinion.203 The Wisconsin Supreme Court then upheld the voter ID law in two
opinions, one on a 4–3204 vote that followed the justices’ ideological
predilections205 and the other on a 5–2 vote,206 again mostly along ideological
lines.207

201 See Richard Niess, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Richard_Niess [https://
perma.cc/5B6U-S5J7].
202 See Daniel Bice, Judge in Voter ID Case Signed Walker Recall Petition,
MILWAUKEE-WIS. J. SENTINEL (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/
141650923.html [https://perma.cc/F76D-KD3W]; Editorial, Complaints Against Judge
Flanagan Are Absurd, CAP. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2012), http://host.madison.com/news/opinion/
editorial/complaints-against-judge-flanagan-are-absurd/article_fdf70e74-6927-11e1-a31c-0
019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/TM22-Z5Y4].
203 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 834 N.W.2d 393,
396–97 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 851 N.W.2d 302 (Wis. 2014). Judge Lundsten, who
wrote the opinion, is “widely regarded as a conservative”; Republican Governor Tommy
Thompson initially appointed him to the bench, after which Judge Lundsten won election
to his seat. See Steve Jagler, Voters Will Decide Fate of Walker’s Bill, ONMILWAUKEE.COM
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://onmilwaukee.com/living/articles/jagler032311.html [https://perma.cc/
8NH6-L3P7]; Melissa McCord, Appointee Looks to Retain Spot on Court, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Mar. 28, 2001, at 3B. Judge Higginbotham was the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals’ first African-American jurist and received his judgeship from Democratic
Governor Jim Doyle. See Historic Court Appointment, JET MAG., Nov. 10, 2003, at 33,
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-110459844.html [https://perma.cc/4K8H-U3DA]. He
also applied for an appointment to the federal bench during Democratic President Barack
Obama’s first term, suggesting that he leans toward a liberal ideology. See Associated
Press, Judges, Lawyers Seek Federal Appeals Court Job, NBC15.COM (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://www.nbc15.com/news/state/headlines/62591442.html [https://perma.cc/7UQV-KA9F].
Judge Blanchard likely leans Democratic as well. See Dee J. Hall, Appeals Court Rejects
Most of ‘John Doe’ Targets’ Motions, WIS. ST. J. (Jan 31, 2014), http://host.madison.com/
news/local/govt-and-politics/appeals-court-rejects-most-of-john-doe-targets-motions/article
_3eeb32b1-2823-5f78-a0fe-46b74051ef73.html [https://perma.cc/WN6A-5DPQ]. He was
elected to the court in 2010 and had the support of both Democrats and Republicans, but
his campaign manager was a longtime Democratic consultant. See Editorial, For Court of
Appeals: Brian Blanchard, CAP. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2010), http://host.madison.com/
news/opinion/editorial/for-court-of-appeals-brian-blanchard/article_5ca9a3c4-2052-5ab2-b
6b4-addd0d21196f.html [https://perma.cc/LP2G-WJDQ]; Bill Lueders, Blanchard or
Leineweber? You Be the Judge, ISTHMUS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.thedailypage.com/
isthmus/article.php?article=28511 [https://perma.cc/8DUK-QQL8].
204 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Wis. 2014).
205 See Jack Craver, Wisconsin Supreme Court Hears Act 10 Case Involving Their
Biggest Financial Backers, CAP. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013), http://host.madison.com/news/
local/writers/jack_craver/wisconsin-supreme-court-hears-act-case-involving-their-biggest-
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The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld its state’s voter ID law in 2011 by a
6–1 vote.208 There is not a lot of information available about the ideology of
the justices on this court, as they are officially nonpartisan and the justice’s
backgrounds do not suggest much regarding their politics, but it is interesting
to note that the only dissenting Justice was a Democratic appointee who was
the court’s first African-American member.209 In his dissenting opinion, the
Justice specifically invoked the country’s history of disenfranchising various
groups such as African-Americans before noting that Georgia’s voter ID
requirement placed similar unnecessary restrictions on the right to vote.210
The connection between ideology and a justice’s vote in a voter ID case is
perhaps strongest in states in which the justices are elected in partisan races. In
these states, the voters themselves know the judges’ partisan affiliations,
meaning that the justices’ decisions must hew more closely to the party line if
they want to avoid electoral backlash.
This rang true in Michigan. The Michigan Supreme Court split 5–2 along
partisan lines in ruling that the state’s voter ID law was valid under
Michigan’s Constitution, even though the state constitution goes beyond the
U.S. Constitution in conferring the right to vote.211 The trend mostly held in
Pennsylvania as well.212 In total, eight judges ruled on Pennsylvania’s voter ID
law: two different trial court judges and six supreme court justices.213 All but
financial/article_fd967a28-4b16-11e3-8023-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/XGW3WLTB].
206 League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 302,
303 (Wis. 2014).
207 Justice Crooks, who dissented in Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker,
wrote a concurring opinion in League of Women Voters v. Walker concluding that he felt
compelled to join the majority in that case based on the standard of review for the facial
challenge that the plaintiffs had brought. Id. at 316 (Crooks, J., concurring).
208 Democratic Party of Ga. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67, 67 (Ga. 2011).
209 See Tom Crawford, State Supreme Court Upholds Voter ID Law, GA. REP.
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://gareport.com/story/2011/03/07/state-supreme-court-upholds-voterid-law/ [https://perma.cc/Q37D-5NBE]; Justice Robert Benham, SUP. CT. GA.,
http://www.gasupreme.us/biographies/benham.php [https://perma.cc/KQH3-89QL] (noting
that Governor Joe Frank Harris, a Democrat, appointed Justice Benham).
210 Democratic Party of Ga., 707 S.E.2d at 76 (Benham, J., dissenting) (“This country
has a long history of denying the franchise to certain groups of citizens—non-property
owners, members of certain religions, African-Americans, women, Native Americans,
young adults aged 18 to 21, etc. It is unfortunate that over the course of the last 13 years,
this State has placed ever increasing restrictions on its citizens’ ability to cast regular, nonprovisional ballots at their local polling precincts.” (footnote omitted)).
211 In re Request for Advisory Op. Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740
N.W.2d 444, 444 (Mich. 2007); see Hasen, supra note 27, at 106.
212 Pennsylvania judges are elected in partisan races. See Am. Judicature Soc’y,
Judicial Selection in the States: Pennsylvania, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=PA [https://perma.cc/EG7J-C3K8].
213 Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 2 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); Applewhite v.
Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17,
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one of the judges followed their ideological predilections, with Republicanleaning judges narrowly interpreting the state constitution and approving the
voter ID law, and Democratic-leaning judges ruling that it was invalid under
the state constitution’s broader right-to-vote provision.214
Although ideology can be a predictor of how a court will rule in a voter ID
case, it of course does not always track each judge’s vote. The Tennessee
Supreme Court, which has at least three Democratic-leaning members, ruled
unanimously to uphold Tennessee’s voter ID law.215 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Indiana was split 3–2 between Democratic-leaning and Republicanleaning judges in 2010216 when it upheld, by a 4–1 vote, Indiana’s voter ID
2014); Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012).
214 Judge Simpson, who initially sided with the state before later putting the law on
hold after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed him, is a Republican. See Francis
Wilkinson, Pennsylvania Voter ID Judge Rescues Republicans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-04/pennyslvania-voter-id-judge-rescuesrepublicans.html [https://perma.cc/J9LX-J2PA] (suggesting that Judge Simpson’s ruling
was good for Republicans because, if the ID law were in place during the election,
Republicans would look bad when elderly and minority voters were turned away from the
polls in a state that Democrat Barack Obama was going to win anyway). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court at the time of its ruling contained three Republicans and three Democrats.
See Joe Palazzolo, Pa. Supreme Court Bounces Voter ID Case Back to Trial Judge, WALL
STREET J.L. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/09/18/
pennsylvania-supreme-court-bounces-voter-id-case-back-to-trial-judge/ [https://perma.cc/
UB7F-GAD4]. The court ruled 4–2 to send the case back to the trial court for a further
inquiry regarding whether the state could properly implement the law in time for the
election. Of the four justices in the majority, three are Republicans. See Applewhite, 54
A.3d at 1; Pennsylvania Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Pennsylvania_Supreme_Court [https://perma.cc/25B9-ECGX]. The two dissenting Justices
who would have invalidated the voter ID law without remanding the case are both
Democrats. Id. Judge Bernard McGinley, who on remand ultimately struck down the law
with sweeping language about the fundamental right to vote under the state constitution, is
also a Democrat. See Associated Press, Judge Spikes Photo ID Requirement for Pa. Voters,
USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/17/
pennsylvania-voters-photo-id/4576139/ [https://perma.cc/XBG9-MUDZ].
215 See City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 88 (Tenn. 2013); Andrea Zelinski,
Q&A: Ron Ramsey on His Controversial Push Against Supreme Court, NASHVILLE SCENE
(May 9, 2014), http://www.nashvillescene.com/pitw/archives/2014/05/09/qanda-ronramsey-on-his-controversial-push-against-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/V8B8-5CB9]
(noting that conservative Lieutenant Governor Ron Ramsey was leading a push against the
retention of the three “Democratic Supreme Court justices” on the court).
216 See Gerald L. Bepko, A Tribute to Justice Theodore Boehm, 44 IND. L. REV. 341,
343 (2011) (noting that Justice Boehm was involved in Democratic politics); Brent
Dickson, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Brent_Dickson [https://perma.cc/8TEGKDEL] (suggesting that Justice Dickson is a conservative); Resume of Randall T. Shepard,
http://www.ai.org/judiciary/press/docs/pr120711-shepard-resume.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4REA-HB2E] (listing several activities with the Republican Party); Frank Sullivan, Jr.,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Frank_Sullivan,_Jr. [https://perma.cc/N8UE-YL2R]
(noting that Justice Sullivan served as the State Budget Director under a Democratic

2016]

STATE JUDGES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE

39

law under the state constitution.217 Notably, however, the dissenting justice
was very involved in Democratic politics before he was a judge.218 Moreover,
the Supreme Court of Indiana decided this case in the shadow of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision upholding the exact same law in Crawford, albeit
under the federal constitution, likely making it harder to issue an opinion that
went the opposite way—unless the court properly interpreted the state
constitution as going further than the federal Equal Protection Clause.219 That
is, a decision hewing to federal protection was easy in light of a recent U.S.
Supreme Court case on the same law, even though the correct analysis would
have shown that Indiana’s Constitution provides more robust protection to the
right to vote than the U.S. Constitution.
These examples show that not every Democratic or liberal judge is going
to invalidate a voter ID law, and not every Republican or conservative judge is
going to uphold a voter ID requirement, but there is still a discernable trend,
particularly regarding the scope of protection afforded to the constitutional
right to vote under state constitutions. It may not be possible to categorize all
judges along an ideological spectrum, and a judge’s constitutional analysis on
this issue may have nothing to do with his or her personal ideological
predilections.220 Moreover, voter ID laws come in different shapes and sizes,
and some laws—such as the ones in Colorado or Rhode Island221—are more
lenient and do not necessarily infringe the fundamental right to vote because
there is really no added burden on voters. Regardless, the analysis shows that
who is deciding these cases can matter a great deal because liberal-leaning
judges seem to understand more clearly that state constitutions provide broad
protection to the individual right to vote that goes beyond federal
jurisprudence.
Governor before the Governor appointed him to the bench); Chris Sikich, Ind. High Court:
Democrats Must Pay Fines in Walkout, USA TODAY (June 18, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/18/indiana-lawmaker-fines-statesupreme-court-ruling/2435003/ [https://perma.cc/26UN-N69U] (noting that a Democratic
Governor appointed Justice Rucker).
217 See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 758 (Ind.
2010).
218 Id. at 773–78 (Boehm, J., dissenting); see Bepko, supra note 216, at 343.
219 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
220 As just one example, Justice Frank Sullivan of the Supreme Court of Indiana has
explained, in some detail, how he consciously tries to avoid any ideological bias in his
approach to judicial decision-making. See Frank Sullivan et al., Three Views from the
Bench, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND
WHAT’S AT STAKE 328–33 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). Justice Sullivan likely leans
Democratic but voted to uphold Indiana’s voter ID law. See League of Women Voters of
Ind., 929 N.E.2d at 773.
221 See Colo. Common Cause v. Davidson, No. 04-CV-7709, 2004 WL 2360485, at *4
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004); Justin Levitt, Rhode Island Voter ID Follow-Up,
ELECTION L. BLOG (May 23, 2012), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=34694 [https://perma.cc/
H9MH-Z665].
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Unlike the moderate correlation between ideology and a judge’s views on
voter ID, however, there does not appear to be as much of a link between a
judge’s partisan background and his or her analysis on felon
disenfranchisement laws. A Republican Governor appointed all three judges in
California who broadened the right to vote for felons by limiting the scope of
the state’s felon disenfranchisement rule.222 The Washington Supreme Court
split in deciding that a convicted criminal must pay the full amount of
restitution before regaining his or her voting rights, with Democratic-leaning
justices in both the majority and dissent.223 Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme
Court split 3–2 in ruling that the state could not disenfranchise a felon whose
crime was not classified as “infamous”; Democratic Governor Phil Bredesen
appointed both the majority and dissenting authors, and both jurists were the
target of conservative groups during their retention election campaigns.224 In
sum, judges from all ideological perspectives have ruled both broadly and
narrowly on the issue of felons and the right to vote.
The lack of a clear link between ideology and felon disenfranchisement
rulings might stem from the long history of felon disenfranchisement in the
United States,225 making it less of an issue of first impression and not as
222 See James J. Marchiano, CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/7643.htm
[https://perma.cc/MU78-5JMC] (noting that Republican Governor Pete Wilson
appointed Judge Marchiano in 1998); William D. Stein, CAL. CTS.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/7710.htm [https://perma.cc/5PV3-QUQM] (noting that Republican
Governor George Deukmejian appointed Justice Stein in 1988); Douglas E. Swager, First
Appellate District, CAL. APP. CT. LEGACY PROJECT, http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
Swager_Douglas_E_Biography.pdf [https://perma.cc/35JD-J5S3J] (noting that Republican
Governor Pete Wilson appointed Justice Swager in 1995).
223 Justice Fairhurst, who authored the majority opinion, leans Democratic. See Mary
Fairhurst, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.ord/Mary_Fairhurst [https://perma.cc/9MFHU8VN] (suggesting a “liberal ideological leaning”). The main dissenter likely also leans
toward a liberal ideology; although little information is available on Chief Justice Gerry
Alexander’s politics, he did face a conservative opponent backed by a wealthy conservative
organization in his 2006 re-election campaign, which suggests that he has a more liberal
outlook than that candidate. See Conversations at KCTS 9: Gerry Alexander, KCTS9
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://kcts9.org/conversations-kcts-9/gerry-alexander [https://perma.cc/
H4A8-786J].
224 See Maya Srikrishnan, Tennessee Supreme Court Justices Win After GOP
Campaign Against Them, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
politics/politicsnow/la-pn-tennessee-supreme-court-justices-win-20140808-story.html [https://
perma.cc/FUV8-7NQC]; Cornelia Clark, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Cornelia_
Clark [https://perma.cc/EC45-3QLC]; see also Conservatives Targeting 3 Tennessee
Supreme Court Judges, INS. J. (May 15, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/southeast/2014/05/15/329092.htm [https://perma.cc/TU8J-3L2Z]; Dahlia Lithwick,
How to Take Out a Supreme Court Justice, SLATE (June 13, 2014), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/06/tennessee_supreme_court_justices_gary
_wade_cornelia_clark_and_sharon_lee.html [https://perma.cc/BZ7D-7E8C].
225 See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness:
The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407,
408–10 (2012) (noting the history of felon disenfranchisement as dating to ancient Greece).
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ideological as voter ID requirements. Moreover, although policy views on
felon disenfranchisement may fall along partisan lines,226 judges will not
necessarily follow suit, especially given that many state constitutions—and,
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Constitution—explicitly
endorse the practice.227 That is, there is legal imprimatur within state
constitutions to uphold felon disenfranchisement laws and reject challenges to
limit their scope, which might trump a judge’s personal ideological
predilections.
Much like with the rulings on felon disenfranchisement laws, the evidence
is mixed regarding a connection between a judge’s ideology and his or her
analysis of rules involving the voting process. On the one hand, there appears
to be little correlation in some cases. Both Republican-appointed and
Democratic-appointed judges rejected the argument that DRE voting machines
violate the constitutional right to vote for some individuals.228 A Republicanappointed judge wrote the Missouri appellate decision criticizing the trial court
judge’s broader ruling that extended the polling hours during the 2000
presidential election, but the court was unanimous.229
Then again, a judge’s own biases regarding the outcome of a disputed
election could potentially affect the scope of a decision on voting rights.230
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the 2008 Norm Coleman-Al Franken U.S.
Senate dispute, initially ruled 3–2 along ideological lines in a preliminary
226 See Jason Belmont Conn, Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the
Legislatures, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 495, 510–16 (2005) (suggesting that the debate over
felon disenfranchisement falls along partisan lines, with Democrats supporting repeal of
disenfranchisement laws and Republicans favoring the laws).
227 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Reduction in Representation Clause explicitly contemplates felon
disenfranchisement); Scott M. Bennett, Giving Ex-felons the Right to Vote, 6 CAL. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2004) (noting that all but two states limit felons’ right to vote and that many of
them do so via their state constitutions).
228 Justice George H. Carley wrote the opinion in Favorito v. Handel, 684 S.E.2d 257,
259 (Ga. 2009), for the Georgia Supreme Court; Governor Zell Miller, then a Democrat,
appointed Judge Carley to the court in 1993. See George Carley, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/George_Carley [https://perma.cc/2QZP-7MBR]. Chief Justice
Wallace B. Jefferson, a Republican, wrote the opinion in Andrade v. NAACP of Austin,
345 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2011). See Andrew Cohen, ‘A Broken System’: Texas’s Former
Chief Justice Condemns Judicial Elections, ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/a-broken-system-texass-former-chiefjustice-condemns-judicial-elections/280654/ [https://perma.cc/K2AL-PD2T].
229 See State ex rel. Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc. v. Baker, 34 S.W.3d 410, 411 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (Judge Larry Crahan); see also Lawrence G. “Larry” Crahan Missouri Court
of Appeals Judge, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 31, 2005, at C8 (noting that Republican
Governor John Ashcroft appointed Judge Crahan in 1992).
230 Many people view Bush v. Gore as the prime example of this phenomenon. See
generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing
Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 113 (2001) (noting
that one immediate reaction to Bush v. Gore was that politics had prevailed over law).
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decision,231 but it ultimately was unanimous in adopting a narrow “strict
compliance” standard for absentee voting that limited the constitutional right
to vote by refusing to count some ballots.232 The fact that the court set out a
narrow rule on voting rights (normally a more conservative position), with an
application that resulted in the Democratic candidate winning the election,
perhaps helped the court reach unanimity, as each side “won” something in the
case. The same might have been true in a Tennessee post-election dispute,
albeit going the opposite way: a Republican-appointed judge issued an opinion
adopting a lenient standard for complying with the voting process, which is
typically a more liberal stance, yet the decision affirmed the election of a
conservative-leaning judge.233
In sum, although not every case follows this trend, liberal-leaning judges
seem to interpret the constitutional right to vote more broadly than
conservative judges, particularly for highly salient and partisan issues like
voter ID. Typically, conservative judges will favor states’ rights and state
sources of law over federal power as a general matter, but the right-to-vote
cases reverse this truism, as liberal judges seem more likely to protect the
broader grant of the fundamental right to vote within state constitutions. This
data can contribute to the ongoing discussion of the kinds of judges we should
put on the bench.

B. Judicial Selection and Decision-Making on the Right to Vote
The voting rights cases discussed above generally involved challenges to a
state law that had the effect of making it harder for typically disfavored groups
to vote, such as poor people, minorities, felons, or the disabled. Perhaps judges
are more likely to rule broadly in construing voting rights for these individuals
if the judges are more isolated from the political process by being appointed
instead of elected, or if they face merely a retention election instead of a
campaign against an opponent. Prior studies show that elected judges tend to
pay more attention to public opinion than appointed judges or judges who
must win only a “yes” or “no” retention vote to stay on the bench.234 Retention
231 See Foley, supra note 169, at 144 (explaining that “the 3–2 split [in the preliminary
ruling] appeared to fall along ideological, if not exactly partisan lines, in a way that
arguably appeared that each of the five Justices was adopting a position favorable to the
candidate the Justice was most predisposed to support in this post-election dispute”).
232 See Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam).
233 Republican Governor Don Sundquist appointed Judge Michael Swiney, who wrote
the opinion. See Stuart v. Anderson Cty. Election Comm’n, 300 S.W.3d 683, 684
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); see also D. Michael Swiney, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
D._Michael_Swiney [https://perma.cc/A3UV-YHRY]. The opinion rejected an election
contest for the Anderson County General Sessions Court Judge, won by Republicanleaning Don Layton. See Don Layton, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Don_Layton
[https://perma.cc/L55B-UAW6].
234 See Damon M. Cann & Teena Wilhelm, Case Visibility and the Electoral
Connection in State Supreme Courts, 39 AM. POL. RES. 557, 568, 570 (2011).
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elections for appointed judges are usually boring affairs with little political
drama,235 but elected judges must actively campaign because they must beat
an opponent who also wants the seat.236 The theory, then, is that elected judges
may be less likely to rule in favor of a political minority than an appointed
judge who will not worry as much about the potential backlash from a
vigorous campaign.237 The initial evidence suggests that for issues that are not
already highly ideological, appointed judges or those who will face only
retention elections are better at broadly construing the right to vote and
including political minorities in the democratic process.238 This finding adds
data to the robust and complex debate over methods of judicial selection.239
For example, judges that narrowed the reach of felon disenfranchisement
laws—thereby including convicted individuals in the electorate and espousing
a broader view of the right to vote—sat on courts with appointed judiciaries
and retention elections. Courts in California, Iowa, and Tennessee ruled that
the state could not disenfranchise the plaintiffs who brought suit, thus limiting
the scope of felon disenfranchisement; judges in these states are appointed
initially and must withstand retention elections to keep their seats.240 The
235 There are, of course, exceptions to the idea that retention elections are usually
apolitical, with the 2010 Iowa Supreme Court’s heated retention election in the wake of the
court’s ruling on same-sex marriage the most notable recent example. See John Eligon,
Iowa Justice Who Ruled for Gay Marriage Faces Test that Three Peers Failed,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/us/gay-marriage-rulingfuels-iowa-vote-on-a-justice.html [https://perma.cc/UAZ8-C284].
236 See Andrea McArdle, The Increasingly Fractious Politics of Nonpartisan Judicial
Selection: Accountability Challenges to Merit-Based Reform, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1799, 1805–
06 (2011–2012) (stating that retention elections historically were advanced as an apolitical
solution to partisan judicial selection and that sitting judges typically prevail, but noting
that recently some retention campaigns have nonetheless fallen victim to politicization and
that some judges have lost their seats).
237 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and
the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995) (examining the difficulty elected
judges face when they are constitutionally bound to protect minority rights).
238 A fuller, quantitative inquiry into the correlation, if any, between the method of
selection and a judge’s ruling on right-to-vote cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
239 See supra note 188.
240 See supra Part III.B; see also Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in
the States: California, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
index.cfm?state=CA [https://perma.cc/PPR2-986S]; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial
Selection in the States: Iowa, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
index.cfm?state=IA [https://perma.cc/KM5H-XJQN]; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial
Selection in the States: Tennessee, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=TN [https://perma.cc/E4CQ-8NRJ]. The Indiana
Supreme Court is hard to categorize, as it ruled both that the state could not disenfranchise
someone for conviction of misdemeanor battery under the state constitution and that the
state was authorized in disenfranchising anyone in jail. Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764,
782, 785 (Ind. 2011). Indiana Justices are initially appointed. See Am. Judicature Soc’y,
Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=IN [https://perma.cc/EN64-SJ77].
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judges that were stricter toward voting rights for felons, rejecting challenges to
the application of the laws, faced regular judicial elections. The Alabama
Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court both issued opinions
upholding the laws and narrowly construing the constitutional right to vote for
felons; justices on these courts are elected.241 This makes sense: felons are not
the most sympathetic group, so a judge facing an election against an opponent
(as opposed to just a “yes” or “no” on retention) might be wary of issuing a
ruling in favor of felon voting rights for fear that it will become a major
campaign issue.
Decisions on the voting process seem to follow this trend as well, with
elected judiciaries ruling narrowly toward voting rights and appointed judges
issuing opinions that more broadly interpret the constitutional right to vote.
For instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—selected through partisan
elections—analyzed the right to vote very narrowly in disenfranchising
absentee voters who did not strictly comply with the rules for delivering their
ballots.242 The Minnesota Supreme Court, also comprised of judges who must
face an election, similarly required strict compliance with voting rules to have
an absentee ballot count.243 But the Tennessee Court of Appeals—selected by
the Governor with retention elections—ruled more broadly in allowing voters
to violate an election statute to effectuate and protect the constitutional right to
vote.244 Similarly, an Arizona appellate court—chosen through merit
selection—was more sympathetic to the argument that DRE machines might
negatively impact voters such as disabled people than both the Georgia and
Texas courts, which contain judges who face regular contested elections.245
241 See supra Part III.B; see also Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in
the States: Alabama, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
index.cfm?state=AL [https://perma.cc/Z2CA-V4X2]; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial
Selection in the States: Washington, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=WA [https://perma.cc/VKU4-ZTNQ].
242 See supra Part III.C; see also In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of November 4,
2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1234 (Pa. 2004); Am. Judicature Soc’y, Pennsylvania,
supra note 212.
243 See supra Part III.C; see also Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 462
(Minn. 2009) (per curiam); Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States:
Minnesota, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=MN
[https://perma.cc/9BFT-CCHQ].
244 See supra Part III.C; see also Stuart v. Anderson Cty. Election Comm’n, 300
S.W.3d 683, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Am. Judicature Soc’y, Tennessee, supra note 240.
245 Compare Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 401 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), with
Favorito v. Handel, 684 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Ga. 2009), and Andrade v. NAACP of Austin,
345 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2011). See also Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the
States: Arizona, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=AZ
[https://perma.cc/9D8K-D8J2]; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States:
Georgia, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=GA
[https://perma.cc/3V7E-QEJV]; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States:
Texas, NCSC, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=TX
[https://perma.cc/X46Y-8WDY].
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This observation is not meant to suggest that the Arizona ruling was correct
and the Texas and Georgia rulings wrong as a legal matter, but only to point
out one variable that might make a difference in whether judges are likely to
interpret voting rights broadly for typically disfavored voters.
But the connection between the method of judicial selection and the scope
of the opinion on voting rights does not hold for voter ID laws, likely
reflecting the sheer partisanship of this issue. Appointed and elected judges
have ruled both ways in these cases. For instance, both Missouri and
Tennessee appoint their supreme court judges, who then face retention
elections, and yet the courts ruled in opposite ways on voter ID.246 Similarly,
the elected justices in Pennsylvania expressed skepticism on the
constitutionality of that state’s voter ID requirement, but the elected justices in
Michigan upheld the law.247 As voter ID is such a partisan issue,248 often
debated in state legislatures along partisan lines, perhaps ideology simply wins
out in the judiciary as well.
To the extent that further data-driven evidence confirms that appointed
judges may be more likely to construe voting rights broadly as compared to
elected judges, we can use this information as part of the debate on judicial
selection.249 As an initial matter, the evidence on state voting rights cases
suggests that, when the issue does not come down to pure partisanship,
appointed judges may be better positioned to construe the state-based right to
vote robustly and thereby include more political minorities in the democratic
process.

C. Selecting State Judges Who Espouse the Ideal of a Broad
Fundamental Right to Vote
As I have explained in previous work,250 we should view the constitutional
right to vote as the most important, fundamental right in our entire democratic
structure.251 Courts should therefore issue rulings in favor of expansive voter

246 See supra Part III.A; see also Weinschenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201, 221–22
(Mo. 2006) (per curiam); City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 104 (Tenn. 2013);
Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States: Missouri, NCSC,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=MO [https://perma.cc/
QEX5-7RW3]; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Tennessee, supra note 240.
247 See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); In re
Request for Advisory Opinion Concerning Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d
444, 447–48 (Mich. 2007).
248 See supra Part IV.A.
249 See supra note 188.
250 See Douglas, supra note 11, at 83–89; see also Chad Flanders, What Is the Value of
Participation?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 53, 56–62 (2013); Michael J. Pitts, P = E2 and Other
Thoughts on What Is the Value of Participation?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 101, 112 (2013).
251 See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 145 (2008).
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access, always with an eye to effectuating the constitutional right to vote.252 It
follows that we should select judges who espouse this value.
A failure to choose judges who understand the importance of allowing
every member of society to participate in our democratic process risks creating
courts that issue decisions undermining the very legitimacy of that democracy.
Take, for instance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion about whether
absentee voters had to return their ballots in person themselves or could have a
third party deliver the ballots for them.253 Recall that local election officials
had explicitly told voters before Election Day that they could allow a third
party to deliver the ballots and that these votes would count.254 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a ruling that is extremely narrow for
effectuating the constitutional right to vote, reversed that position.255 The
court’s decision was grounded in a concern over potential voter fraud in the
delivery of absentee ballots.256 But devoid of evidence of fraud with these
actual ballots, the result was the disenfranchisement of fifty-six voters who
had relied on the county’s official pronouncement. Even if the state has a
legitimate interest in rooting out absentee ballot fraud in general, the decision
was particularly concerning for that election and for those voters given that
local election officials had said absentee voters could cast their ballots this
way. These votes may have altered who won, undermining the democratic
legitimacy of the person elected. The media hardly took notice of this drastic
opinion striking down a “long-standing practice by election boards across the
state,” with only a short mention in an AP alert.257 Other judges, who would
construe the constitutional right to vote more broadly, might have come to a
different conclusion that would be more protective of the fundamental right to
vote.258
How do we find these judges? First, as discussed earlier, we need to pay
more attention to the kinds of analyses our current state judges employ on
issues involving voting rights. This scrutiny will help us discern whether
252 For an argument that judges should apply a statutory canon of construction in favor

of voter access, see Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 73
(2009).
253 In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223,
1234 (Pa. 2004).
254 Id. at 1226–27.
255 Id. at 1234.
256 Id.
257 See Mike Crissey, State’s Highest Court Bars Some Deliveries of Absentee Ballots,
AP NEWSROOM (Mar. 9, 2004).
258 Indeed, a federal court ruled that Ohio must count ballots that were cast improperly
in the wrong precinct due to poll worker error, even if counting those ballots would violate
state law. See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 598 (6th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (finding a due process violation in a state law requiring election
officials to disregard wrong precinct ballots cast because of poll worker error); Hunter v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 236 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding an equal
protection violation on the same issue).
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judicial rulings reflect our core values regarding democratic participation.
Legal analysis has nuance, and a judge that values individual voting rights
over state regulation of elections has a different view on the meaning of the
constitutional right to vote than a judge who is more deferential to state
regulation of the voting process. We need judges who will recognize that state
constitutions go further than federal law in explicitly conferring the right to
vote to all citizens. Second, to the extent there is any connection between the
ideology of the judges deciding these cases and their judicial opinions, as is
the case with voter ID, we can use that evidence to influence Governors,
appointing commissions, and voters on the merits of the individuals seeking
judicial office.259 Finally, if the mode of analysis differs based on the method
of judicial selection, as it appears to do for certain issues such as felon
disenfranchisement, then we should use this data to inform the debate over
how we select our judiciary.
This Article does some heavy lifting on the first inquiry—shedding more
light on the role of state courts in dictating the scope of the right to vote. It also
offers some preliminary thoughts on the second and third points.
Debate on these substantive issues should be a greater part of the judicial
selection process itself. This proposal is not meant to suggest that judicial
selection should become more partisan or ideological than it already is. In an
ideal world, judges would be truly “independent” and decide cases solely
according to the “law.” But that is unrealistic, for two reasons. First, the law is
not so clear that there is always one true answer. Reasonable people can differ
on whether they value the constitutional right to vote over state regulation of
elections, or vice versa. When selecting a judge, then, we are making a choice
between these options. We should do so consciously and deliberately. Second,
judicial selection is already partisan, especially for elected judiciaries. We
ignore the kinds of judges we select, and their likely ruling on issues of
importance such as the right to vote, at our peril.

V. CONCLUSION
State judges have a tremendous impact on how we understand the right to
vote. When judges interpret the state-based constitutional right to vote broadly,
they provide the best safeguard for the most fundamental right in our society.
By contrast, when judges narrowly construe the constitutional protection for
voting, they improperly constrict the import of the explicit conferral of voting
rights within state constitutions.
As a scholarly community and a democratic society, we have failed to
analyze state court decisions on voting rights in any robust and holistic manner
to recognize these differences. Studying the cases demonstrates how some
259 This suggests that we need more quantitative empirical data on judges and their

rulings on voting rights. A previous study already showed that political party funding of
judicial elections is tied significantly to a judge’s decisions. See Kang & Shepherd, supra
note 63, at 1243–44.
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judges properly interpret the right to vote robustly and independently from the
U.S. Constitution, while other judges simply follow federal guidance and
thereby provide only narrow protection. This limited analysis, however,
conflicts both with the explicit conferral of the right to vote within state
constitutions and our overall concept of voting as the foundation of our
democracy.
Beyond advocating for broader rulings as a legal matter, the preliminary
evidence suggests that we should consider a potential judge’s views on
election law issues when vetting them and that decisions on voting rights
should inform the continuing debate on judicial selection. Ultimately, if as a
society we believe that the right to vote is among the most precious,
fundamental rights we enjoy, then we should choose our state judges based on
whether they will broadly interpret that state-based right. The initial data
suggests that, at least in some contexts, liberal and appointed judges may be
better suited at safeguarding voting as a fundamental right than their
conservative and elected counterparts.
There is a role for the public as well. We need to educate ourselves about
the positions of those who seek judicial office on issues of importance such as
the rules for an election, and then vote accordingly. By becoming more
informed citizens, we can influence state courts to make smarter decisions in
upholding the fundamental, constitutional right to vote.

